What Drives Iran's Behavior and Worldview? What Are the Paths for Change?
I. Introduction
Problem Defined
Iran has behaved belligerently, including using terrorist attacks, supporting unscrupulous regimes and proxies, and has been an overall destabilizing force in the Middle East. How to understand what drives its actions, and how to address them?
Setting The Stage
Iran is a complex entity. What drives its leadership is a nuanced, and often contradictory, set of factors. Before proceeding straight to the thesis statement, let's first set the stage for how to think about the problem.
Fallacies and Oversimplifications Regarding Iran's Leadership
Belligerent because it is evil
Monolithic and unified
Driven solely by cold rational calculations
Driven solely by religious dogma
Unswayable in its hardline path, and should be dealt with using only pressure
Emergent Realizations
Recent history is extremely salient and formative for the current regime.
With time, Iran's unrepresentative and reactionary political system is coming into greater conflict with changing public sensibilities and expectations regarding how Iran's society should be structured domestically and how the regime should behave abroad.
Iran's future trajectory, both in the short and long terms, is tenuous and responsive to how it is viewed and dealt with from outside.
Thesis
Iran's leadership and the current political system is a product of recent tumultuous history. The current system is not sustainable in the long run and is responsive to outside engagement. Understanding the peculiarities of this system and its leadership requires understanding its constituent parts, how they are layered, and under what context did those parts assemble together to form the current whole. Such understanding is key to successfully dealing with Iran and influencing how it behaves abroad.
About This Piece
This is piece is based on open source research. It should be considered as an educated opinion.
II. Recent History's Impact On Current Regime
Imperialism, Shah's Authoritarianism & Cold War Hanky Panky
For most of the 20th century prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran's foreign relations were influenced by Western interests, especially British and American petroleum industry, and western post-WW2 resistance to Soviet influences in the Middle East. Containing the spread of communism and securing energy supplies onto which western economies became highly dependent were of such geopolitical importance, that authoritarian regimes like the Shah of Iran (as well as Chile's Pinochet regime and others around the globe) became more tolerable then they otherwise would be and sometimes even necessary partners in resisting the Soviet threat in countries that were vulnerable to influence from the Soviet Union. Western direct involvement in the inner workings of Iran’s politics and petroleum industry has been well documented, including aiding the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh and pressuring the Iranian government against nationalizing its petroleum industry. But global realpolitik considerations were of little consolation to the people that had to bear the oppressive tactics that such regimes employed against them to maintain power. It's only natural that countries that provided to Shah military, political and financial support, such as the United States and others, would be held in low regard by the Iranian population. When the Shah's regime was toppled, the political authorities that would immediately follow, whether theocratic or not, would not be friendly towards the west. Unfortunately for Iran, its post-Shah popular fervor reflected an association between some of the realpolitik measures within Iran by the Western block, in its Cold War struggle against the Soviet bloc, with the broader western values of personal liberty, tolerance, separation of church and state, and the like. As a result, the once the hated Shah was overthrown by popular revolt, the zeitgeist of the moment in Iran contributed to the new politics being not only anti-Shah in character but also broadly against Western values. We're often reminded of that in the media when an occasional Iranian hardline figure, like the recent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will spew hatred against the "Jews" and the "West" in a way that would seem imbecilic if it wasn't so egregious coming from a person that held such prominent positions of power. By now the sensibilities of much of the Iranian population has actually gravitated towards Western values, having experienced several decades of rule under the clergy and the crony military-industrial system. But in 1979, a clergy-dominated political system was in line with popular aspirations.
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: the Right Man, at the Right Place, at the Right Time
Once in a rare while, an individual is able to influence a country's politics for generations by providing a strong narrative that resonates extremely well with an audience in a given time and place that wouldn't resonate as much under other circumstances. Examples include individuals like Napoleon Bonaparte in post-monarchy France, Adolf Hitler in post-WW1 Germany, Oliver Cromwell in England, Martin Luther in late medieval Germany. The way that Ayatollah Khomeini was able to influence the post-Shah Iranian political order puts him within this group. When a person or the system that he is promoting polls in the high-90% for a protracted period of time, and it's not a rigged election like with Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Kim Jong Il in North Korea, then something very significant and impactful is transpiring within the body politic as a result of that person. Even if Iran would’ve nevertheless become a theocracy (peppered with a dash of democracy) like it is now, without Khomeini's presence at the time the levels of post-Shah religious fervor and clerical veto power over Iran's representative institutions for generations ahead would probably be much lower. Khomeini's words were taken as gospel and had a direct influence on Iranian law. That's indicative not only of high levels of religiosity but points specifically to a cult of personality. As time passes, the mental fabric of Iranian society is reverting to the mean regarding religious fervor and social conservatism on which the current Iranian regime depends, not only due to globalization and other forces of human conversion towards progress in the aggregate but also by virtue of the fact that Khomeini's cult of personality is losing its salience through the distance of time. However, since the representative character of Iranian politics is constrained by the clerics, whether through banning too-liberal candidates from standing in elections or by being able to veto any law deemed contrary to clerical standards, such time distance doesn't affect the Iranian political leadership as much as it does the overall population. As a result, Khomeini-like influence is able to persist in Iranian politics more than it does within the Iranian society at large. Such a divergence between the leadership and the population will only get wider with time and is not sustainable indefinitely. But until something gives, the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini's cult of personality will continue to exert itself on Iranian leadership's behavior.
Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988)
Much of Iran's current political and military elite are a product of the Iraqi-Iran war of 1980's which, by being a struggle for survival within the first decade of the post-Shah order which would have been tumultuous even without the war, made a huge imprint on Iranian leadership's worldview and behavior for decades.
Struggle for Survival
The war started as an Iraqi invasion of Iranian territory. Iran's structures and institutions were weak at the time due to the post-Shah upheaval. Not only did Iran have to deal with a military invasion, but it did so while undergoing great socio-political volatility which made the state weak. The war took up most of the 1980's and served as an oven within which the raw dough of post-Shah institutions would be baked into a hardened product all the way into the current times.
Large Casualties. An estimate of 1-2 million casualties within a population of around 40 million during the 1980s means that 2-5% of the population either died or was injured as a direct result of the war. Most of the population either had a casualty of war in their family or within their wider social circle. Having such a wide effect and within the national borders, as opposed to fighting a war far away from home, must have a profound impact on the population and on the political and military leadership that led the effort for national survival. By contrast, American casualties during its socially impactful war in Vietnam were 300 thousand which constituted a much smaller 0.15% of the population of 200 million in 1970 and took place far from the national soil. As much as the Vietnam war impacted the American social zeitgeist, it was little compared to the impact that the Iran-Iraq war had on Iran. A more comparable analogy would be the American Civil War in which 800 thousand casualties represented about 3% of a population of 30 million in the 1860s and involved battles and devastation within the national borders. That war is still prominent within the American psyche, and it would be even more so had it not been triggered by internal political differences between secessionist and unionist factions but by a whole-nation fight for survival against an external enemy.
Chemical Weapons. There has been much media coverage and outrage regarding the usage of chemical weapon in wars. Chemical weapons are considered to be a more heinous way to wage war then using conventional weapons by the international community. Examples include Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks against the Kurds in Iraq and Bashar Assad's attacks against the rebel-supporting civilian neighborhoods in Syria. Both sets of events triggered a huge moral outrage. Iran suffered from similar kinds of chemical weapon attacks during the war with Iraq. There are people in Iran who still suffer from the effects of those chemical weapon attacks.
Human Wave Attacks + Child Soldiers. Due to a shortage of arms and trained soldiers, groups were set up made up of volunteers that, being very lightly armed and trained, were used for purposes like running across fields to clear mines or to simply overwhelm the Iraqi forces with bodies when other means were not enough. Such groups often included children. The way these human wave formations were recruited include appeals to nationalist and religious sentiments as well as coercion. In any case, the death and suffering endured by these and other forces helped to propagate a narrative of victimhood as a result of external aggression.
Cities Bombed with Scuds. Battles were fought not only on the front lines. Cities far from the frontlines suffered from Scud missile attacks. People in many cities could not feel fully safe during the war. Such present danger on the part of the broader society, as opposed to just the armed forces, has effects that last for a long time after the war is over.
International Isolation
International Support Favored Iraq. Iran was isolated by much of the world during the war with Iraq. Most of the global and regional powers—including the West, USSR and Persian Gulf monarchies—supported Iraq against Iran with money, arms, and supplies. Iran's belligerent behavior was a big reason for that, such as the taking American embassy personnel hostage while demanding the handover of the Shah back to Iran or physically targeting Iraq's oil trade with other nations. As well, much of the international support to Iraq was provided not at the outset of the war for the direct benefit to Iraq's military invasion, but mostly after Iran started turning the tide against Iraq and for the purposes of containing Iran more than to benefit Iraq. In any case, despite its realpolitik rationale, international support to Iraq further served to promote Iran's sense of victimhood and international isolation.
Only Meaningful Support: Syria. Syria was the only sizable nation that provided meaningful direct support to Iran.
Shared Fear of Iraq. Both Iran and Syria considered Iraq under Saddam Hussein to be a threat. Once Saddam's forces invaded Iran, Syria under Assad considered itself to be Saddam's next stop afterward. Helping Iran to resist Iraq's military aggression helped Syria to prevent itself being Saddam's next victim.
Similar Sectarian Power Base. Both Iran and Syria shared a non-Sunni sectarian base of power. Syria's Assad regime promoted members of its Alawite Muslim sect to the top political and military positions of power, while Iran's theocracy is based on Shiite Islam. Alawite and Shiite doctrines are related to each other and provided a commonality of interests for both Syria and Iran in resisting Sunni sectarian interests. For Syria, this meant resisting the domestic majority Sunni population. For Iran, this meant resisting Middle Eastern Sunni sectarian-based regimes like Iraq. As a result, Syria shared Iran's interest in having the Iraqi invasion of Iran fail.
Immediate Necessity -> Future Capability
Iran was not prepared for Iraq's invasion, especially given Iran's socio-political turmoil associated with transitioning from the secular Shah's regime to a theocracy-dominated republic. Necessity is the mother of all inventions, and Iran had to be quite inventive to develop ways to resist Iraq's invasion. Whatever capabilities are developed in a time of crisis remain potent even after the crisis is over, and the same was true for Iran's capabilities after the war with Iraq was over.
Underground Global Networks. At the time of Iraq's invasion, much of Iran's military technology and assets were those that the West supplied to the Shah's military. But due to Western sanctions put in place after the Shah was toppled in the 1979 revolution, Iran couldn't source replacement parts and other necessary services to maintain them. The Soviet blocks of nations, which was in competition with the West, was supporting Iraq's side of the war, so they could not be tapped for military aid as well. As a result, Iran had to desperately squeeze all its contacts, sometimes even resorting to relying on family and friends in other countries, to try to source the much-needed arms and replacement parts, even if on the black market. Whatever efforts were fruitful over time turned from thin threads to thick ropes after the war was over, and continued to be used to source supplies, to serve as clandestine networks, and as ways to wield influence. One example is Iran's network in South America, build on top of a Persian community that existed at the time of the Iran-Iraq war. Later in the 1990's Iran would use this network to retaliate against Israel's military pressure against Hezbollah by perpetrating terrorist bombings against Jewish centers and other locations in Buenos Aires, London, and other places. The networks that the post-Shah Iran's regime had to desperately develop during wartime in the 1980's have continued to prove useful to project influence and as means of applying pressure on Iran's geopolitical rivals like Israel, the United States, and others.
Indigenous Military Industry. Being poor and cut off from military aid sources required Iran to bootstrap a domestic arms manufacturing industry, which eventually was able to produce unsophisticated but effective assets.
Examples.
Speedboats with heavy guns
Rocket and explosives technology
Tanks
Future Uses. Some of the homegrown military technology, after further refinement, eventually was used to devastating effect in other conflicts, including:
Hezbollah. Hezbollah's terror campaigns against Israel and military pressure against Lebanon's central government.
Post-Saddam Iraq. Some Iraqi Shia militias used explosives technology which Iran refined over the years to devastating effect in Iraq against the US-led coalition troops.
Parallel Domestic and Foreign Security Structures. New regime's mistrust of the existing domestic and foreign security structures led to the creation of parallel security structures, such as the IRGC (Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps) and its foreign intelligence QF (Quds Force or Jerusalem Force). The development of these forces went into overdrive once Iraq started the war.
Foreign Proxies
Kurds. Both Iran and Iraq were heavy usage of foreign proxy forces against each other, especially each other's respective domestic Kurdish populations. Iran developed strong relationships with Iraqi Kurds, which have long tried to resist central Iraqi authorities and provided Iran an additional venue by which to project influence in Iraq, even up to today. In turn, Iraq used Iranian Kurds to put pressure on Iran by exploiting Iranian Kurds' aspirations for autonomy from Iranian authority. Such usage of proxies against one's opponents is nothing new in the Middle East region, and the Iran-Iraq war accelerated Iran's development of this common Middle Eastern competency faster than it would otherwise, given its preoccupation with its own internal affairs prior to Iraq's invasion.
Hezbollah. Another example of Iran's successful wartime development of a foreign proxy that eventually turned into the gift that keeps on giving is Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia militia that eventually developed a political faction and continues to provide Iran ability to project influence in the Levant up to today within Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Hezbollah receives money, arms and other support from Iran. In return, Hezbollah is expected to support Iranian interests, as it did by terrorist attacks against Israel and its current fighting alongside Assad's forces in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah is based in one of the few Shia regions of the Middle East outside of Iran and which isn't already strongly dominated by a Sunni regime. It was one of the few places in the region in which Iranian influence could take hold and coincided with the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's which forced Iran to seek proxy allies. It's arguable that if Iraq didn't start the war against Iran, then Iran may have been too preoccupied with its domestic situation to bother building foreign proxies like Hezbollah when it did.
Malleable Dough -> Finished Baked Product
By the time the war with Iraq was over a new post-Shah institutional character was in place which has defined the Iranian leadership's worldview and has driven its behavior both domestically and abroad up to today.
Domestic Consequences
Homegrown Military Capability. Through wartime necessity, Iran developed a homegrown unsophisticated but effective military industry which helped to exert regional influence despite its international isolation. Without the war with Iraq, Iran's leadership would've had little reason to focus on establishing its own military industry as their plate was full managing the domestic transition into a post-Shah socio-political order. When the war broke out priorities shifted towards the physical security of the nation and the need to manufacture its own armaments.
Nationalism. Iran became a more cohesive and fervent society having experienced existential fear from external aggression, wartime society-scale mobilization, collective sacrifices, and almost prevailing against the enemy. Although the levels of nationalist fervor would subside throughout the years after the war—due to events receding into history, the average person's prioritizing a better life over dogmatic doctrine, and the unsustainability of security structures managing large parts of the economy—nationalism was at a high point when Iran's political and security institutions were set in place, and therefore, contributed to how those institutions would behave in the years afterwards.
Entrenchment of Security Structures. Iran's security structures play such a broad and deep role in Iran's society that not only is there the usual repressive paranoiac treatment of reformers and dissidents on a mass scale, as is the usual practice among revanchist regimes, but those structures also play a huge role in the country's economy. The wartime marshaling of the industry towards the war effort did not unwind after the war was over. Today some industries are wholly or in part owned and managed by the security structures. Combining security organizations with economic means of production is a very unhealthy combination for the following reasons.
Economic Mismanagement. Security organizations play a very important role in every nation because they provide for the most basic human need: physical security. Such organizations require high levels of specific narrow competencies, and as such are a bad match for managing anything other than that which pertains to national security. Even with the best of intentions, security organizations are at a disadvantage when it comes to managing non-security efforts for efficiency and productivity compared to those who specialize in the given areas. It wouldn't be optimal to have military or intelligence organizations manage supermarket chains, determine education curriculums, set pension policies, or managing Facebook. It may be determined that certain industries are so vital to national security that security organizations should have control over them. But such measures, though may be considered necessary, come at a price of lower efficiency and productivity. This tradeoff in Iran is so stark, that for example, although it’s among the biggest hydrocarbon producers in the world, it still needs to import refined gasoline. This being the case after decades of having control over the nation’s hydrocarbon industry is a testament to the security structures' disgracefully low performance in managing the nation's economic capacity.
Corruption. Being ranked in the bottom quartile of countries based on corruption perception, Iran is in similar company as struggling sub-Saharan countries, Asian former Soviet satellites, and the basket cases of the world. Much of that comes from the decades-long merging of security and economic sectors. A vibrant economy requires easy entry and exit of market players and a meritocratic competition between producers of goods and services based on innovation and efficiency. All else being equal, the more a nation deviates from that model the more undeveloped its economy will be, and Iran is very far from such a model. When national organizations that specialize in war and in foreign and domestic intelligence have influence over, and directly benefit from, private companies and industries, then economic opportunities and rewards flow not to centers of innovation and efficiency, but to those who are the closest to the security apparatus. Those who simultaneously wield the biggest stick and have a lot of economic power become politically influential, are incentivized to prevent reform, and have the ability to maintain the status quo—their influence becomes entrenched in all aspects of the nation. A similar corrupting merge between security and economic sectors are found in countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Pakistan. In Iran, the only single block that is able to counter the military-economic block are the clerics. But their own interests in maintaining the current socio-political arrangement, as well as occasional disunity within their own ranks, make their overall political calculus largely overlap, even if not completely aligned, with the security structures.
Foreign Consequences
International Clandestine Network. Iran has been able to develop and maintain strong international clandestine networks whose value stems from procuring military technology while isolated and under international sanctions to economic gain from organized crime. These networks are in large part based on and grew on top of the networks that Iran desperately sought out during the war with Iraq.
Suspicion of Foreigners, Especially The West. Iran's foreign support in its war with Iraq came mostly from Syria. Many other nations and blocks, including both the West and Soviet blocks, put their chips behind Iraq once Iran was able to turn the tide against it. Whatever suspicions and resentments Iran had from decades of Western influence in the form of economic interests or anti-Soviet measures were multiplied as a result of an existential war against a foe which received Western and Soviet support.
Fear of A Strong Iraq. Even prior to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, there were tensions between Iran and Iraq over issues like border delineation, waterway rights, competition for dominance in the region, support for each other’s Kurdish separatist movements, clandestine support for coups against each other's regimes. There was no shortage of reasons for both Iran and Iraq to be suspicious of each other. Saddam Hussein sensed that Iran was at its weakest during the post-Shah sociopolitical volatility and decided to pounce, at which point the relations between the two countries were no longer just about competing for resources and regional influence, but in a national war of survival akin to WW2. Unfortunately, Iran and Iraq did not reconcile with each other after the war was over like France and Germany did after WW2. Tensions continued into the recent times, such that after Saddam was toppled by the US-led invasion in 2003, Iranian leadership made a strategic choice to wield maximum influence over Iraq's post-Saddam politics and military so that Iraq does not post an existential threat to Iran ever again.
The Character of Leadership. The political and military elite that comes about after a recent history of being a stage of imperialist and cold war activities, going through a period of secular authoritarianism, followed up by a religious revival and an existential war against a neighbor, share the following characteristics:
Scrappy
Resentful
Mistrusting of outsiders
Nationalistic
Able and willing to fight dirty, including resorting to terrorism
III. Current Situation
Power Blocks
Political power in Iran is divided among 3 main blocks.
Clergy
Unlimited Control Over Legislature. Although Iran is officially a republic, the clergy wields so much control over the legislature that the latter cannot be deemed representational, nor independent.
Legislative Veto That Cannot Be Overruled. The clergy block any law or administrative measure that it deems is not conforming to their interpretation of Islamic doctrine.
Control Candidate Lists. The clergy can prevent any candidate from standing in elections that it deems is not fit to serve.
Defines The National Vision. The clergy, especially the Supreme Leader, officially wield supreme power over all Iranian institutions and the overall socio-political order.
Military
National Security. Responsible for the country's internal and external security, military and intelligence operations, and maintain relationships to foreign proxies and networks. Think of it as the combined armed forces, DoD, CIA, FBI, DHS, National Guard, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection Service, and other security organizations being managed under a single top-level structure.
Economic Interests. As outlined earlier, the security structures have interest and ownership in large swaths of Iran's economy.
Reformers
Catch-All Bucket. Various collection of intellectuals, students, the bourgeoisie, some political parties in the legislature, some moderate factions in the theocratic institutions, and much of the broad population, who want to put the past behind and integrate with the rest of the world as a mainstream country.
Big in Number, Small in Political Power. Reformers sometimes have the majority of seats in the legislature. But because the legislature is subordinate in political power to the clergy, much of progressive legislation and measures are blocked or have no effect. The brutal suppression of protests in 2009 that sprang up in response to supposed electoral fraud that disadvantaged the reformist presidential candidate is an example of the weakness of the reformists relative to the clergy and the military.
Coercive and Opportunistic Foreign Policy
Foreign Networks and Proxy Militias
Purposes range from smuggling military supplies to get around international isolation to economically-driven organized crime networks.
Usually, but not always, based within communities with Shiite or Persian ties: Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, parts of South America, and others
Supported, or even established, proxy militants like the Kurdish KDP and PUK in Iraq against Saddam Hussein's regime, and Hezbollah in Lebanon in order wield influence in the Levant region. There is also evidence that Iran is supporting the Houthi rebels in Yemen's civil war.
Mistrust of Iraq, Gulf Monarchies, Israel and The West
Iraq invaded Iran after long and tense history which lead to a decade-long existential war between the two. After Iran was able to resist the initial hit and turn the tide of the war, Iraq was able to secure support from the West, the Soviet bloc, and the Sunni Gulf monarchies. Although Iran would eventually align closer to Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, it continued to be antagonistic to the West and the Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia whose regime promotes a particularly fervent flavor of Sunni Islam which is naturally at odds with Iran's Shiite theocratic state.
Plays Dirty, Strategically Uses Terror
Examples include:
The bombing of Jewish center in Buenos Aires
Attempt to assassinate Saudi Arabian ambassador to the US
All the Hezbollah's operations against Israel, including rocket attacks
Hosted Al-Qaida operatives and their families, which fled Afghanistan after US-led anti-Taliban/Al-Qaida efforts in 2001, as a way to wield influence with Al Qaida and to use as a potential tool to pressure the US within the Middle East
Opportunistic Alliances
Iran establishes opportunistic and expedient relationships with other nations based on crude self-interest rather than any broad-minded aspiration towards the rule of law or even Shiite Islamic doctrine. Examples of such opportunistic alliances, with countries that on paper should be anathema to Iran's Shiite theocratic system, include:
Syria: secular Baathist regime.
Russia: secular crony capitalist state with sympathy towards its Communist past.
North Korea: secular Communist gulag state.
Qatar: Sunni monarchy with which Iran shares the world's largest gas field “North Dome / South Pars”.
Pakistan: majority Sunni country.
Control Over Institutions by Clergy and Military
Clerical control over society and culture.
Military (armed forces and intelligence structures) control over national security and economy.
Mismanagement and Corruption
The merging of security structures, which operate with few checks and balances, with much of Iranian industry and means of production provides a lot of incentives and opportunities for massive corruption across the nation.
IV. The Unsustainability of Current Situation
The current socio-political situation in Iran is not sustainable, especially in the long term. The way that the clerical regime and military exercise control over national institutions is no longer aligned with the aspirations of most of the population. The influence of the clergy and the military over the Iranian legislature reduces its representational character, the divergence between what the people want and what the regime allows will only increase with time.
Declining Popular Support for Current System
Formative Events Receding into History
20th-century events that shaped the current Iranian leadership are becoming less salient as the events recede into history.
Different Facts on the Ground. Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, which presented a real threat to Iran, is no longer in power. In fact, Iraq is currently in large part under Iran's influence. Imperialism and the Cold War are over. The unchanging rhetoric against the West and the Jews is even more unconvincing given that Iran's main rival in the region is Saudi Arabia, which is neither Jewish nor Western.
Demography. The current distribution of Iranian population is heavily weighted towards younger people that weren't born yet when the formative events took place, including the Shah's regime, its fall and replacement by the theocratic republic, and the war with Iraq. Those events, which are so salient to the old guard that's currently in power, don't resonate as much in the hearts and minds of the younger generations.
Passions Calm Down Over Time. As time passes, historical events can be seen with the benefit of hindsight and in a more objective way. This is true for all societies, including Iran, where the popular view on events like the American embassy hostage crisis is one of contrition and regret. Iranian culture, especially Persian, places a high value on honor and virtuous behavior. Despite the hardnosed realpolitik reasons for taking the embassy members hostage, such as demand for the extradition of the Shah or as revenge for perceived historical slights, storming an embassy is nevertheless an egregious act that breaks established diplomatic norms that exist to promote civilized diplomatic processes. Regardless of the reasons to do so, the mob-like storming of the embassy and the holding its personnel hostage for hundreds of days is widely considered within Iranian society as a regrettable stain on Iran’s international image. Such a revised look at previous historical events often take time to materialize.
Growing Divergence Between Population and Regime
Elections. Even after all the vetting and blocking of candidates by the theocrats, the Iranian legislature still often has a sizable, sometimes even majority, representation by reformers, which points to strong popular support for reform.
Education. On average people are more educated and less provincial in outlook now compared to when the Shah was overthrown. In fact, Iran is among the most improved nations in the world in terms of education between 1980 and today. All else being equal, the more educated a society is, the more worldly and tolerant its people tend to be and the less support they provide to a theocratic regime that promotes a single religion. Such attitudes are not in congruence with Iranian theocratic system.
Modernity. The existence of the internet and modern communication technology makes it harder for any single regime to sway the national consciousness.
Political Unrest
There have been violent mass protests, such as in 2009 when the reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi was expected to win the presidential election against the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner who is close to the military but lost due to suspected vote tampering. The military was able to squash the protests using violence. But give the real possibility that such events may happen again in the future, it's uncertain if the current vested clerical and military interests will be able to impose their will successfully each time.
Chronic Economic Underperformance
Military's control over large portions of Iranian economy results in gross mismanagement and corruption. By now the Iranian military is no longer seen as a brave group of volunteers ready to defend the nation against external aggression, as happened during the war with Iraq, but more as a set of powerful crony economic and political interests.
Outdated Rhetoric
Experience = Teacher
Much of the religious revival that characterized the 1979 revolution is quite diminished as people got a chance to experience several decades of restrictive theocratic rule to their disappointment.
Message Continuity Despite Reality
After decades of nasty rhetoric against the Jews and the West, including calling the USA the devil, it would be a bitter admission to all of a sudden change tune. Often after a rapprochement measure between Iran and the West, The Supreme Leader makes a speech against Israel and USA, just to remind everyone that Iran making deals with the West, like the Nuclear framework deal in 2015, is not an admission that it's changing its outlook. It's getting to a point where such rhetoric, despite not being taken seriously by many, is said in order to maintain message continuity and to prevent looking weak. Unlike secular political leaders, The Supreme Leader has less room to change the rhetoric because, being associated with the supernatural, he cannot be seen to have changed his mind or admit being wrong like a regular human being. Having less room for flexibility, he and much of the clerical and military leaders continue the same rhetoric from time to time out of inertia and lack of other easy PR options, if not for any specific strategic reason.
No Recent Strategic Successes
Since Iran's successful resistance against Saddam Hussein's aggression in the 1980's, Iran has had few major strategic successes that would enhance the long-term viability of Iran's current system. Its recent involvement in Iraq's politics and the Syrian civil war enabled the rise of ISIL, an organization which Iran has been unable to counter by itself. Although the military is a powerful domestic institution, it has been unable to independently achieve strategic success outside Iran's borders for quite some time.
V. Path for Change
Key Factor: Dynamic Between Clergy and Military
Different Sources of Power
Military: Arms, Money, Organization. Having standard armed capabilities and control over large parts of the Iranian economy, the military can project power not only as an armed force but also as a crony organizational web.
Clergy:
Popularity. Although Iran's clerical institutions are much less popular now than they were after the Shah was toppled in 1979, the religious authorities depend on popular acquiescence at the very least, if not full support.
Political Inertia. It's easier to change the nature of a middle-ranking position or administrative organization in response to new circumstances or changes in popularity then it is to change the nature of the very topmost position or institution because the middle one has someone above it to make decisions on its behalf, whereas the top of the political pyramid has no one above it to make decisions on its behalf other than itself. As a result, although the clergy's popularity has declined over the years, there is still sufficient level of popular support which gives it the ability to maintain power by virtue of being at the top of the political pyramid.
Clergy More Reformable Than Military
Clergy More Responsive to Social Changes Than Military. Clerical institutions derive their power from socio-cultural sources and are responsive to changes in popular sentiments, especially if those changes are driven by forces outside its control. For example, the Catholic church is currently trying to update its image to remain relevant with the world's Catholic communities having selected from among its ranks the reformist Pope Francis who, relative to previous Popes, is promoting a more tolerant vision for the church regarding homosexuals, people of other faiths, and non-believers. Some churches in the Western world are allowing women to hold high clerical positions, which was not the case prior and is an adaptation to the evolving societies within which those churches operate. In general, although clerical institutions are often very powerful and have deep societal reach, they are also well served to be in tune with the societies where they operate and are eventually responsive to broad cultural changes that are beyond their control. In the case of Iran, the clergy has been able to maintain power despite declining popularity because it's not only a religious institution but also a political one. But it too cannot continue carrying on business as usual if the gap between it and the population continues to widen. On the other hand, militaries don't need to rely on social popularity or the belief in god to maintain power because they have guns and can use hard coercion to impose their will. As a result, in the long term the clergy will need to adapt more to the popular sentiments then the military will need to maintain prestige and influence.
Clergy's Ranks Change Over Time, But Iranian Military-Economic Web Is Entrenched. The ranks of the clergy change over time. Currently, The Supreme Leader is quite old and had suffered age-related illnesses. Someone will replace him from among the clergy, just as he replaced the first Grand Ayatollah. But the web of military and economic interests on which the security structures rely for power projection is quite entrenched—its incentives and processes, barring any large developments, will continue to remain in place even as the top military positions of power change hands over time. As time passes, newer generations of clerical leaders will be able to update, if they so choose, the clergy's relationship with the general population. On the other hand, if the military changes its crony web of economic interests in response to popular demand, the military's influence will decline. Therefore, the clergy has more room than the military to adapt without relinquishing influence.
Who Is More Powerful?
Officially the military answers to The Supreme Leader, who is the head of state and is part of the clerical class. However, if The Supreme Leader and the clergy decide to pursue policies that run counter to the military's interests, it's debatable whether the military will obediently go along. Despite the clergy's official status, the military has arms and economic resources at its disposal. So far the clergy and military have had overlapping, if not exactly aligned, interests. But if those interests diverge, it's unclear what would transpire and whose interests would win out. There has been uneasiness between the clergy and the military in the past, notably during the military's brutal suppression of the Green movement protests after the 2009 presidential elections whose results many consider to have been fixed by the military. If The Supreme Leader had taken the side of the protesters at that time, then not only would he be openly going against the interests of the military, but he would also be enabling a popular fervor that demanded socio-political reform that may have affected the clergy as well as the military. For The Supreme Leader and the clergy in 2009 that was a bridge too far. In the future, with the Iranian population having grown further apart from the current political system, that bridge may seem much closer to cross than it was in 2009, at which point the Iranian political reality may undergo a profound shift.
VI. Take Aways
Don't Take Iran's Belligerence at Face Value
Iran's belligerence can be extreme and with lots of geopolitical consequences including terrorist attacks; alliances with unsavory regimes like Hugo Chavez, Hezbollah, North Korea, Russia; nefarious pressure on Israel, Lebanon, Iraq; unhelpful influence in contexts like the Syrian Civil War, Iraqi internal instability, and Middle East nuclear proliferation. There is much to criticize Iran and work to resist its activities. But the underlying drivers of Iran's belligerence is not simply evil or even extreme religious dogma, but recent formative history and unrepresentative theocratic and military institutions.
Iranian System Has Expiration Date
The way Iran currently goes about its business has an expiration date that's coming up soon. If Iran's institutions were able to more accurately reflect the popular will and could accommodate socio-political changes, then it would be able to adapt to the times. But its current power structures are not flexible enough or sufficiently based on reality to indefinitely proceed as is.
Best Strategy = Engagement, Not Isolation
Think of Iran as a two-headed being, or a split personality, whose sides have different visions for itself—one promotes hardline belligerent policies, and the other wants political reform and engagement with the international community. The best strategy is not one that seeks to isolate the whole being, but on the contrary will involve engagement with it, using both carrots and sticks, that empowers the reformists and puts pressure on the hardliners.
Addressing Iran's Foreign Policy Will Also Affect Its Domestic Policy
Iran's institutional MO, especially within the clerical and military institutions, is largely a reaction to external influences. All else being equal, addressing Iran's knee-jerk behavior outside its borders, using both carrots and sticks, would influence its institutions in ways that would have an effect not only on the country's foreign policy but also on its domestic dynamics. Taking away Iran's rhetorical legitimacy, as well as reducing both its ability and need to project belligerence abroad, should make Iran less bunkerish and shift its focus inwards where there is a lot of room for progress. Logically speaking, if Syria became an untenable area for Iran to project influence, whether due to a US-led military and civilian push against Assad and ISIL or something else, and the regional cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia could be addressed by reaching some kind of accommodation between the two, then Iran's ability and need to project hard power in the region would diminish, and a more inward focus could foster more substantive reform.
Clergy and Military May Not Always Be In Lockstep
Power in Iran is divided into 3 distinct blocks: the clerics including The Supreme Leader; the military-economic web including Revolutionary Guards, Quds Force, domestic intelligence, and other security structures; and a loose block of reformers made up of majority of the population, intellectuals, students, small businessmen, some reformist clergy, political dissidents and many other constituents who are not happy about the nation's poor economy, stifling of individual freedoms, and a foreign policy that isolates the country from the international community. The first 2 of these blocks are usually closely aligned and determine the country’s regional behavior. But that alignment isn’t a constant. In fact, there have been times when the clergy and the hardliners of the military-economic complex have had tensions. One way to disincentivize such lockstep belligerence by the clergy and the military is to engage Iran in a way that makes it both less fearful in terms of security, such as addressing its interests in Iraq and de-escalation of tensions with Saudi Arabia, while at the same time reducing its ability to project belligerence in the region via proxies like Hezbollah or within contexts such as the Syrian civil war.
