The regime in North Korea has Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, and threatens to use them against South Korea, Japan and America. Why is the regime acting like this? What can and should be done about it?

Thesis

Best Policy: Detente with Carrots & Sticks

The best way to address the threat from North Korea is to pursue a comprehensive deal whereby through a sequence of alternating reciprocal steps both parties move closer to detente. North Korea would be expected to give up its WMD programs and threatening military posture against South Korea, Japan and America in exchange for security guarantees, official conclusion to the Korean War that goes back to the 1950’s, official diplomatic recognition, and economic aid. It should be expected that North Korean regime will try to cheat on the deal. Therefore, any deal with North Korea should not rely on goodwill or relationship building, but should be a business-like agreement that includes the strictest verification and enforcement mechanisms. As well, North Korea’s options to sustain its regime militarily and economically outside of the deal should face maximum pressure in order to tie regime’s viability to the viability of the deal.

Disproven Policies: George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” & Barack Obama’s “Strategic Patience”

Although the policies of the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama regarding the North Korea problem seemed different in style, their strategies had a common fundamental flaw in that little was done to influence the regime’s calculus, and therefore had little effect on the regime’s behavior. George W. Bush cartoonishly referred to North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”, while Barack Obama’s administration aloofly sat on the sidelines as per its “Strategic Patience” strategy. But other then pushing through resolutions at the UN Security Council (which were usually watered down by China and Russia) and a few other measures on the margins, little was done to fundamentally influence how the North Korean regime viewed its interests. Both administrations assumed that the North Korean regime would likely capitulate to American demands or collapse under the weight of its own internal systemic failings. But whether due to the lack of situational awareness on the part of American leaders, or perhaps because they had other priorities, the North Korean problem was allowed to deteriorate by giving the regime the time to develop yet more powerful weapons.

Know All the Cooks in the Kitchen

The North Korean issue cannot be comprehensively dealt with bilaterally. It directly involves the security and strategic interests of at least 6 major players: South Korea, USA, China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea itself. Many factors point towards the possibility of a comprehensive detente on the Korean peninsula, but there are also many challenges, chief among which is the fact that although all the parties want to prevent war as their top priority, their secondary priorities are not only different but often in conflict with each other. Any deal involving any of these parties can be rendered ineffective by any of the other parties. In order to effectively address the North Korean problem, one must understand the positions and interests of each of them regarding the Korean standoff because the success of any detente will depend on compromises and understanding which gears to grease, and which not to, and why.

About This Piece

This is piece is based on open source research. It should be considered as an educated opinion.

II. Historical Background

The situation on the Korean peninsula is unique. Understanding the context, what led to the current situation, and how the problem has been addressed in the past will inform how best to proceed forward.

Historical Fast-Forward

Dynasties & Feudalism

For centuries, Korea was a single people ruled under a Confucian dynastic royal court system. Social structures were thoroughly medieval in that the economic, military and political roles were filled by a triangle of peasant farmers, armies, and landed nobility. History unfolded such that industrialization and social reforms came late to Korea compared to Japan or the Euro-centric world. After seeing how Japan was able to quickly modernize itself and prevent the same outcome that befell China, whose developmental lag made it a victim of European colonialism, Korea finally decided to pursue fundamental reform in 1894. But it was too little too late. Japan by then was much further ahead economically and militarily such that it was able to subjugate Korea as a colony.

Japanese Imperialism & WW2

Japanese control over Korea spanned the 1st half of the 20th century, culminating with the fall of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific War theater of WW2 at the hands of America and its allies. The Japanese regime was ethnocentric and marshal in character. It pushed the Korean economic base and educational system to much higher levels, but treated the Korean people as second class citizens. Many of those social scars suffered by the Korean people then are still felt today.

Artificial Division: Stalin's Mini-Me Orwellian Regime in the North & America-Sponsored Clunky Authoritarianism in the South

After the defeat of Japan, the Korean peninsula was jointly occupied by the Soviet Union in the north and by America in the south. Stalin had no plans to let the socio-political system in the north to be anything other than a copy of the Soviet Union itself, and forcibly installs a captain from the Soviet Red Army as the de facto leader of its occupied Korean territory, while eliminating any existing Korean political movements who could compete with him. That captain, who happened to be of Korean origin and with prior history of waging anti-Japanese guerilla attacks, was named Kim Song-Ju. But with the help of Soviet propaganda machinery, his name was changed to Kim Il-Sung, which translates to "Kim become the sun". The sun god goes on to rule the north like a pharaoh for decades, while the south starts off as a tenuous democracy under the savvy America-educated strongman Syngman Rhee (or Rhee Syng-Man as per Korean name format) who secures America’s economic aid and security guarantees against aggression from the North.

Korean War & Cold War

With Stalin’s blessing, Kim Il-Sung invaded the South in 1950 in an attempt to extend his rule over the whole Korean peninsula. The Cold War is in full swing, and America pushes back militarily under the political cover of an official UN mandate. The north is repelled too far back for China’s comfort who decides to intervene. The whole peninsula is devastated and the 2 sides reach a stalemate near the original US-Soviet division line. Cease fire is reached, though nothing that officially ends the war is signed. The north and south continue to be in opposing Cold War camps, and develop under completely different conditions. South Korea is given the opportunity to get on its own feet and flowers into a strong and viable modern nation, while North Korea becomes an Orwellian nightmare where the regime basically prays on the biomass of its citizenry like a vampire.

Cold War Ends, WMD Threats Begin

After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the post-Soviet Russian state dropped economic subsidies to North Korea. Without the external support, North Korea’s internal systemic failings came to the surface and famine ensued. By this time North Korea was economically and militarily lagging behind South Korea. Unlike most other countries that had belonged to the Soviet bloc and had either reformed or outright switched to the market-based democracy model, the North Korean regime decided to stick the course with its oppressive system. To make up for its systemic disadvantages it invested in WMD capabilities with which it can pressure America and its allies for security guarantees and economic aid. America, South Korea and Japan pursue various strategies to try to get the North Korean regime to be less belligerent. China also want regional stability, but doesn’t want the regime to collapse for fear of massive North Korean refugee flows into its territory, and to prevent North Korea from falling into the America-led liberal camp. Russia is on the margins, maneuvering for economic and strategic benefit.

Previous Attempts at Solving the Problem

Agreed Framework (1994)

The Agreed Framework came out of the negotiations between America and North Korea by which the latter agreed to dismantle its plutonium-based Yongbyon facilities in return for America helping to build a light water reactor, which is harder to repurpose for weapon use, and providing shipments of heavy fuel oil, which would help replace the lost output from Yongbyon. The Agreed Framework came apart after a few years for the following reasons:

US Congress Dragged Its Feet. Shortly after the Agreed Framework was signed, Republicans win majorities in the US Congress in 1994 and start dragging their feet regarding heavy fuel oil shipments, while proposing little alternatives for how to deal with the North Korean threat.
North Korea Cheated. Despite seemingly going along with the Agreed Framework for a few years, North Korea proceeded to cheat on the deal by pursuing uranium enrichment and performing long-range missile tests. It also actively traded weapon and missile technologies with the likes of Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya and others. The Agreed Framework was going nowhere fast and the North Korean regime ratched up the threats. In 1998 it flew missiles over Japan and starting in 2006 it started testing nuclear weapons on its territory for everyone to see.
Agreement Was Too Narrow. The Agreed Framework wasn’t comprehensive enough. It didn’t limit all of North Korean WMD capabilities, nor did it address weapons trafficking. As well the Agreed Framework didn’t come along with a comprehensive strategy to reduce the regime’s ability to cheat. The Agreed Framework could have been a precursor to subsequent negotiations that could have addressed all these things. But since the Agreed Framework went nowhere, it’s hard to tell either way.

South Korea's Sunshine Policy (1998-2008)

After decades of bitter hostility, South Korea tried a policy of accommodation towards the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun. The idea was that joint economic projects that the regime could benefit from economically and mutual security reassurances would induce the North to be less belligerent. This policy failed to change the regime’s behavior because its calculus can’t be much influenced by South Korea alone. When less dovish administrations came to power in South Korea, this policy was for the most part discontinued.

Six-Party Talks (2003-2009)

Since the failure of the Agreed Framework, America’s position has been that any resolution to the standoff on the Korean peninsula needs to include all the relevant parties, which we believe was very much correct by that point. Other relevant parties, especially China, wanted a bilateral agreement between America and North Korea. Chinese leadership calculated that a bilateral deal that kept itself out would diffuse the security issues while letting China retain flexibility of action in the region. The result was the Six Party Talks, which were a series of diplomatic discussions aimed at addressing the Korean standoff involving all the relevant parties: both Koreas, USA, China, Japan and Russia. Little was accomplished because America demanded from North Korea to make up for previous untrustworthy behavior by dismantling their nuclear capabilities before real business could be discussed, while North Korea, in its usual bluster, refused to give up its biggest source of leverage. Joint pronouncements were made after each round of talks stating that everyone’s goals continue to be peaceful and resolving to continue the talks further. But little of substance was achieved. Meanwhile North Korea makes further progress in its WMD programs and stages progressively more threatening stunts like sending missiles over other countries and detonating progressively more powerful nuclear bombs. America’s response includes publicly castigating the North Korean regime and pushing through UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions aimed at North Korea, many of which the North Korean regime is able to evade enough so as to sustain itself. North Korea’s strategic calculus remains unchanged, and after another belligerent stunt in 2009 the Six Party Talks discontinue.

Singapore Summit (2018)

Yet another attempt at resolving the North Korea issue, this time after North Korea detonated its largest yet nuclear bomb in 2017 and after heated rhetorical exchanges between Donald Trump, much on Twitter and often in contradiction to his own administration professionals working on the issue, and Kim Jong-Un via the regime’s media mouthpieces. Trump and Kim hugged it out in Singapore and issued statements of intentions to work out a deal. Trump cancelled the scheduled joint military exercises between America and South Korea as a conciliatory gesture. In return, North Korea took small steps aimed at reducing its weapon capabilities. Is this a start to a comprehensive detente? Or is this another flirtation that won’t lead to anything substantial? The situation is ongoing and it’s to be seen how it all plays out.

Policies of US Presidential Administrations Since Cold War Ended

Bill Clinton: 1994 Agreed Framework

Bill Clinton was probably the most situationally aware and prudent regarding the North Korea problem since the Cold War ended. The 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea seemed like a viable means to detente, but due to issues on both sides, it was close but no cigar.

George W. Bush: "Axis of Evil" & Six-Party Talks

George W. Bush’s strategy regarding North Korea, like with many other issues, involved a lot of bravado, but little substantive thought about the path ahead. His cartoonish “Axis of Evil” speech is by now an embarrassing historical side note on the record of America’s global leadership, and his administration’s strategy during the Six-Party Talks did nothing to influence North Korea’s calculus regarding its own behavior. Among the few proactive steps taken was the Proliferation Security Initiative, whereby with American leadership about half the world’s nations agreed to a set of coordinating mechanisms to interdict North Korea’s smuggling and trade in WMD technologies. But other that, the policy is mostly reactive instead of proactive, and did little to change North Korean behavior.

Barack Obama: "Strategic Patience"

Whether in reaction to the recklessness of the previous administration under George W. Bush or just due to a different view on how the world works, Barack Obama’s foreign policy tended to be overly cautious and sometimes altogether MIA until a crisis erupts. The North Korea issue was no exception. The administration’s “Strategic Patience” strategy, just like GWB’s strategies, calculated that there is a decent chance that the North Korean regime would either collapse under the weight of its internal systemic failings or would capitulate to America’s demands, and therefore sat on the sidelines while the situation continued to deteriorate. The North Korean regime not only survived, but was able to develop yet more powerful WMDs.

Donald Trump: TBD?

The Trump administration’s strategy regarding the North Korean threat is yet to run its course. Despite the heated exchanges between Trump and Kim, including the infamous “Fire and Fury” comment, after the Summit in Singapore it seems like the two sides are exploring a potential deal. The situation is still unfolding.

III. North Korean Regime

The standoff on the Korean peninsula has involved multiple players for a few generations. But since the end of the Cold War, the main source of instability has been North Korea itself. In order to understand what drives the behavior of the North Korean regime, we need to understand how the country became what it is, what sustains it, and how does it see the path ahead.

Evolution of North Korea’s Regime

Orwellian Perfect Storm

At the time of the Korean division, North Korea was fertile ground for an absolutist regime, especially given the strategic support from a superpower like the Soviet Union. The Korean society has recently exited the feudal social structures, was subsequently dominated by a foreign Japanese Empire for half a century, had most of its economic base destroyed during the Korean War, and had most of the domestic leadership other then Kim Il-Sung’s faction wiped out through purges with assistance from Soviet security services. With many social, economic and political institutions in tatters, the situation was ripe for a forceful imposition of a new socio-political system.

Stalin Imposes Soviet Socio-Political System
- Kim Il-Sung: Suitable Soviet Puppet. When Kim Il-Sung arrived at the scene as part of the Soviet Red Army with the defeat of Japan, no one in Korea knew who he was. He had no domestic base of support. In the 1930’s he was a guerilla fighter against the Japanese in China, and was somehow apprehended and interrogated by Soviet intelligence after which he was placed as a soldier in the Soviet army, rising to the rank of captain. Speculations about him include the fact that he may have been apprehended by the Japanese who turned him into spying for them against the Soviets, who in turn turned him into working for the Soviets. Whether that’s true or not, the fact remains the same that Kim Il-Sung has operated in many theaters, none of which were inside or directly related to Korea. This is why when he arrived into the Soviet-occupied northern part of Korea, he was a complete unknown and had no political base of support. Other individuals were a much better fit for leadership, like Pak Hon-Yong, Cho Man-Sik and Kim Koo. But being Korea nationalist first and Communist second (if at all), they were not a good fit for Stalin to serve as a Soviet puppet. So the Soviets groomed and installed Kim Il-Sung as de facto leader and helped him establish a Soviet style domestic security apparatus with which his cult of personality would rule until his death in 1990’s and continued under his dynasty to the present day.
- Regime Consolidates & Isolates Itself. After Kim Il-Sung falls out of favor with both Soviet Union and China, an attempt is made to replace him using North Korean communist factions that were loyal to either Soviet Union or China. Kim Il-Sung is able to counter that challenge and purges the governing class of disloyal factions. He subsequently consolidates power around his cult of personality and promotes an isolationist “Juche” ideology through which the country would try to reduce reliance on the outside world. Kim Il-Sung tried to keep the Soviet and Chinese influences at bay, while playing them off one another for maximum patronage. The tricky and volatile relationship that North Korea has with China and Russia today started at this time.
Fertile Context for Oppressive Social System
- Foreign Domination Is Nothing New. Korea has often been dominated by bigger neighbors, like China and Japan. Having to follow the direction of Soviet Union or USA wouldn’t be something that’s completely out of the nation’s experience.
- Little Experience With Representative Government. The Korean populace at this point had little experience with popular political participation and the motions of democratic politics, except for a few violent peasant rebellions during the dynastic period.
- Culture is Highly Hierarchical. Traditional Korean culture is heavily influenced by Chinese Confucianism. Until the Gabo Reforms around the turn of the 20th century a commoner was supposed to move aside and bow to anyone from the upper Yangban social class whenever they came across each other, even if the commoner is a grown adult and the Yangban is just a young kid. It’s easier to impose a political system in which the power at the top is unchecked when the social context already includes huge differences in the standing of different social groups and subservience is part of the society’s muscle memory. A society that is more egalitarian and has higher expectations of its leaders would be much harder to rule as such.
- Korean War Destroys Existing Social & Economic Base. The North’s invasion of the South and the war that ensues destroy much of the economic and social bases of the Korean peninsula on top of which new economic and social systems could be developed, relatively speaking, from scratch.
- Small Middle Class. Every vibrant liberal democracy has a sizable middle class. Without a vibrant middle class it’s hard for a domestic political context to exist in which all or most of the population’s interests are taken into account. At the time of partition, Korea was undeveloped and its middle class was very small.
- Totalitarian Template Already Perfected. When Kim Il-Sung was imposed as the ruler of North Korea, the path to a totalitarian system was already written in the Soviet Union and could be replicated domestically. His regime didn’t have to invent anything new. He could simply follow Stalin’s playbook for how to impose a Communist single party rule, establish a pervasive domestic control system, and promote his cult of personality. Even the visual aesthetic of the propaganda in North Korea and Soviet Union (especially during Stalin’s reign) are almost exactly the same. This is not a coincidence.

North & South Proceed on Different Paths

Both Koreas started at similar stages of development with per capita GDP on par with Sub-Saharan African basket cases, but proceeded on drastically different paths.

South Korea: Phoenix Risen From The Ashes. Starting with the savvy maneuvering by its America-educated authoritarian leader Syngman Rhee, who secured from America financial aid and security guarantees against Communist aggression, South Korea was given room to get on its feet. Politics was often messy and included both democratic and authoritarian periods. But it was always anti-Communist and focused on economic development. That growth, and the associated expansion of the middle class, led to permanent democratic changes in the 1980’s. Today South Korea is a thoroughly modern and developed nation, with among the highest human development indicators in the world.
North Korea: Stalin’s Wet Dream Turned Into Orwellian Nightmare. Unlike in South Korea, the North Korean regime basically acts like a parasite to its own population. Being a commoner in North Korea is among the worst human experiences on the planet socially, psychologically, economically or politically. A telling example of how the regime relates to its citizens is the story that the regime promotes domestically about a father who chose to save the pictures of Supreme Leaders King Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il rather than help his daughter during a flash flood. The girl drowned and the father was made into a national hero for choosing to save the leader’s portraits over the life of his daughter. Note, the North Korean regime doesn't shy away from this story, but on the contrary promotes it as a model for its citizens to follow.

Cold War Ends, But Kim Regime Endures

Internal Systemic Failings. After losing artificial external economic support when the Soviet Union collapses, North Korea’s internal systemic failings come to the surface. Decades of communist top-down command system has left the economic capacity in shambles. It couldn’t borrow from the international financial markets because it had previously defaulted on its debts in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Together with ecological mismanagement and bad harvests, famine ensued in the 1990’s during which between 500,000 - 2 million people may have died out of a total population of around 20 million people. In 1995 an army unit tries to stage a coup, but is violently suppressed.
Regime Adjusts & Endures. The regime tries to adjust given its economic and military lag behind the South.
- Prioritize Military. In response to the failed coup in 1995, the regime starts to prioritize economic resources, including food, towards the military at the expense of other social groups as part of its Military First (“Songun”) policy.
- Petty Markets. Food shortages forced many people to resort to barter and petty merchant activity outside of government distribution system, even at the risk of facing the government’s wrath. For many it was either that or starvation anyway. Such market activities (“Jangmadang”) were eventually skimmed by the regime itself as a form of economic racket that funneled revenue up the hierarchy. Today a large portion of North Korea’s internal economy depends on such petty markets, even if technically speaking private enterprise is still officially illegal. In other words, the North Korean regime is itself a criminal that violates its own laws against private economic enterprise.
- Smuggling Networks. The regime uses any available links to the outside world to source economic resources and weapons capabilities, including official embassy staff, spies and migrant laborers. Any method of securing these benefits are pursued, regardless of international norms and rules.
Regime’s Survival Strategy: Use Belligerence to Blackmail for Economic & Security Benefits
- Deteriorated Strategic Position. Around the time that Korea was divided, both north and south were at similar developmental points. But by now the two have diverged greatly and the North’s strategic position relative to the South has deteriorated in terms of economic and military capabilities. South Korea is a regional economic heavyweight with a modern professional military. North Korea can hardly feed itself and has a military that is high in quantity but low in quality.
- WMDs Provide the Biggest Strategic Bang for the $Buck. Developing WMDs, like nuclear and chemical weapons, is much more cost effective than upgrading the military en masse to compete with South Korean military, especially when WMD technology can be jointly developed with the help of Iran, Pakistan and others. Developing a modern military is a different story. Fighter planes, for example, require resources available only to superpowers. Another capability that provides a big bang for the buck is cyber weapons, which may or may not have similar impact as WMDs depending on how they are used. Cyber capabilities are cost effective because they don’t require much heavy physical investments, but depend on a set of highly educated cadres and sufficient access to the internet. Although North Korea’s internet infrastructure is small, China and Russia allow North Korea to route internet traffic through their telecom networks. From the Chinese and Russian perspective, this arrangement not only serves to reinforce their patron relationship with North Korea, but also helps them obtain knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities on their adversaries that also tend to be North Korea’s adversaries as well, particularly America. As well, cyber capabilities can be used for economic gain though financial cyber criminal activities. Taken together, WMDs like nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with cyber, are the cheapest way to be a threat to more developed adversaries then wholesale military reform.
- Makes Regime Collapse More Risky For Others. Although many would welcome regime change in North Korea for security and humanitarian reasons, the presence of WMDs on the North Korean territory influences the calculus of outside actors by making chaotic domestic political changes within North Korea more risky. When no one is in charge of the situation, WMDs may be set off by rogue elements or sold to other bad actors. In this way WMDs serve as an insurance policy for the regime against any potential outside efforts at regime change within North Korea.

What Sustains the Regime?

The North Korean regime pulls out all the stops with regard to controlling their population. The Kim family’s cult of personality opportunistically borrows from several sources: Stalin, the Korean feudal caste system, and the traditional Korean mysticism. Indoctrination and coercion is applied from the earliest stages of a person’s development and continues even after death--for some transgressions it’s not only the given person that’s punished but also multiple of his/her subsequent generations as well. The regime also aims to isolate its society from outside influences. It controls all media sources, and foreign travel is strictly limited.

Economic Racket

Although private economic activity is strictly outlawed, in practice it’s tolerated by the government because it provides a way for some of the population to feed themselves without being a burden on government’s scant economic resources and it provides a way for the regime to skim off of these activities though bribes and fees that aggregate at the top. Often, senior leaders and their family members are involved in such market activities. As well, doling out opportunities for economic gain is among the ways that the regime incentivizes key power centers to remain vested in the regime’s continuation. Like in Iran and Pakistan, where the military is heavily involved in large parts of their national economies, in North Korea among the perks of being a military leader is the control over the associated revenue streams. For example, different security factions have competed for control over fisheries. As well, the regime exports migrant labor to those willing to hire North Korean workers (mainly China, Russia and joint economic projects with South Korea), the majority of whose earnings are absconded by the regime. It’s a telling fact that although these migrant laborers tend to work in poor conditions, under constant surveillance, and with very little pay leftover, it’s still sought after because it's an improvement compared to what’s back home.

Weapon Sales

North Korea has sold weapons, ranging from small arms to missile technology, to willing buyers like Iran, Libya, Syria, Pakistan and others. It’s thought that Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in 2007 was developed with the help of North Korea.

Strategic Patrons: China & Russia

China and Russia are the chief sources of external patronage that keeps the regime going.

China’s Economic Support. Trade with China, which stands at a few billion $USD per year, constitutes over 90% of all North Korean exports and imports. Most of it is made up of Chinese imports of North Korean coal and other resources, while exports include basic industrial inputs.
Russia’s Economic Support. Russia has increased its economic ties with North Korea since the 2000’s. Russia’s economic support to North Korea is different from China’s in that, being resource rich, it has little interest in North Korea’s natural resources. Instead Russia allows tens of thousands of North Korean migrant laborers to work inside Russia and send remittances back home, much of which is skimmed by the North Korean regime, and has forgiven most of North Korea’s debt (around $10 billion) that goes back to the Soviet times. Russia is positioning itself to benefit in the future from selling natural gas to South Korea through the North and to link up the Korean peninsula transportation networks with its own in order to serve as a trade platform between East Asia and Europe.
Dilution of UN Security Council Measures. China and Russia have often diluted or blocked UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions regarding North Korea.
Support for Cyber Infrastructure. Both China and Russia allow North Korea to route its internet traffic through their telecommunication networks. China facilitates several thousand North Korean hackers to study and operate from Chinese territory. Perhaps such arrangements are a quid-pro-quo which allows them to learn from the activities of North Korean hackers, while giving the hosts the cover of plausible deniability. Regardless of the motive, facilitating North Korea’s cyber capabilities is a major form of support. Without China and Russia, North Korea wouldn’t be able to stage the kinds of cyber attacks that it’s known for because it would require a major upgrade to North Korea’s telecom infrastructure that’s outside of North Korea’s current capabilities.

South Korea's Sunshine Policy

Between 1998-2008, South Korean dovish presidential administrations attempted to influence the North Korean regime towards a more constructive path through joint economic projects which relied mostly on North Korean labor. The economic value of such activities per year went up to a few hundred million $USD per year. Unlike with China and Russia, South Korean economic support wasn’t meant to take advantage of economic opportunities or to advance one’s strategic position, but in order to be a positive influence on North Korean behavior. Nevertheless, South Korea’s outreach measures made little impact on North Korean overall belligerence because, alone by itself, South Korea isn’t able to sufficiently influence North Korea’s calculus without comprehensive engagement from America.

Regime’s Strategy Going Forward

Main Goal: Survival

The regime’s main goal is self preservation in light of internal systemic failings while the world is pulling further ahead.

Methods

Blackmail Others with WMDs For Security & Economic Benefits
- Develop WMD capabilities in the cheapest way possible, including nuclear, chemical, biological and cyber weapons.
- Communicate the threat loud and clear with attention grabbing stunts like detonating nuclear bombs, sending missiles over the territories of America's allies, and issuing threatening official statements.
- Perpetrate attacks to send a message like the sinking of South Korean military ship Cheonan resulting in around 100 casualties, artillery bombing the Yeonpyeong island, and blackmailing Sony to prevent the release of the satirical movie The Interview that makes the Supreme Leader look bad.
Access Hard Cash Via Criminality
- Use diplomats and spies to tap into global criminal networks for currency counterfeiting, illicit drug trafficking, weapon systems, etc.
- Cybertheft, like the heist from Bangladesh Bank in 2016 through which North Korean hackers were able to seal around $100 million from Bangladesh’s central bank, or the WannaCry virus which demanded ransom payments to unlock infected machines.
Prioritize Military Over Everyone Else. After a failed coup attempt by a disgruntled army unit in 1995, the regime started to prioritize access to economic resources to the military at the expense of all others in order to keep the military on the side of the regime.
Reform as Little as Possible. Changing a system that relies so much on coercion and control risks unraveling the whole system. Therefore, the regime is interested in keeping the levers of power over its society unchanged as much as it can. The regime is sometimes forced to adjust, like in the case of tolerating private petty markets to help the people feed themselves. But the regime adjusts only when it has no other choice, and otherwise prefers to keep things domesticallyas they are.
Prevent Emergence of Competing Power Structures. The regime goes to great lengths to prevent the emergence of rival centers of power and brutally suppresses any that do emerge.
- Botched Currency Revaluation. The botched currency revaluation in 2009 forced everyone to exchange old bank notes for new ones up to the equivalent value of only a few hundred $USD dollars. Beyond that limit, one’s previous savings were wiped out because they would remain in the form of the old currency that could no longer be used for payments. Among the reasons for going through with this currency revaluation was to prevent the emergence of a middle class by erasing the wealth generated from petty market activities. This had 2 major ramifications that the regime didn’t expect:
  - Rare protests broke out in some North Korean cities, in response to which the regime raised the currency exchange limits several times.
  - The North Korean currency became virtually abandoned in favor of foreign currencies like the US Dollar and Chinese Renminbi.
- Purge of Jang Song-Thaek. Purge of Kim Jong-Un’s uncle Jang Song-Thaek and those close to him due to Jang’s accumulation of domestic power that could rival the Supreme Leader and the top crust of the elite, as well as Jang’s supposed communications with the Chinese behind the back of Kim Jong-Un.
- Assassination of Kim Jong-Nam. The assassination of Kim Jong-Un’s half brother Kim Jong-Nam in Malaysia, who supposedly favored reform and was close to the Chinese, and thus could potentially pose a challenge to the current regime.

Observations

North & South Started Similarly, But Diverged Greatly

Division Was Artificial. Prior to the occupation of the northern territories by the Soviet Union and the southern by America, both were part of a single unified Korea going back centuries to antiquity. The way division came about is complex and involves subjective historical interpretations. Most likely the story boils down to agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin during WW2 to jointly occupy Korea, instead of solely by America, in return for Soviet Union entering the Pacific War on the side of America against Japan, particularly against the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria. It was estimated that decisively defeating the Japanese empire would result in 500,000 additional American casualties due to the nationalist zeal of Japanese society and the reputation of the Japanese army, especially in Manchuria. America didn't yet have the atomic weapons, which it would eventually develop and use against Japan, and its estimates didn't take into account that the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria was a shell of its former self towards the end of the war. So most likely asking Stalin to intervene against Japan, and the associated division of Korea, was probably unnecessary. In any case, notwithstanding the historical reasons, Korea’s division was man made and as a result of realpolitik.
Developed in Opposite Directions. At the time of division, both north and south were poor and undeveloped. Today South Korea is a highly developed nation with average per capita annual GDP of $30,000, wheres in North Korea it’s only $1,000. South Korea is a thriving liberal democracy with all the typical messy motions of democratic politics, whereas North Korea is an Orwellian nightmare.
Divergence of Conventional Military Capabilities. Both north and south started with underwhelming peasant armies. But by today their conventional capabilities have diverged greatly. Today North Korea can most likely inflict devastating damage onto the South with conventional artillery and hordes of cadres due to their proximity. But the quality of North’s conventional military gear is low and grandpa-old, its air force is basically non-operational, and the competence and will of its regular soldiers to fight is suspect. In contrast the South Korean military is highly professional with all the bells and whistles of a modern military. If a conventional war broke out between the 2 Koreas, then without WMDs the north would probably lose resoundingly.
Large Scale Natural Human Social Experiment. Doing scientific experiments related to human group dynamics is trickier than in the physical sciences. In physical sciences you can directly test a variable by applying it differently to 2 identical contexts. For example, to test the effect of sugar on the taste of water one can take 2 cups of water, plop a sugar cube into one of them, taste both cups and note the difference in taste. If one tastes differently from the other, then it could only be because of the sugar cube because all other factors remained the same within the 2 cups. Answer found! Scientific experiments may be costly to set up, like the Large Hadron Collider. But as long as you’re able to obtain the data, then verifying the hypothesis becomes straightforward. But in the human domain it’s hard to find a large enough homogeneous population for study that could be randomly split and let develop under different conditions, while keeping other factions the same. In test labs, such experiments would be unethical, like the Stanford Prison Experiment, or simply impossible to set up on a mass scale. In the real world, the split of Korea into the northern and southern parts is a rare case where the exact same population was artificially split during a state of underdevelopment and let progress under completely different socio-political systems, all while observable to the outside world.

Regime is Rational & Influenceable

Despite its bombastic and colorful rhetoric that’s not above dissing world leaders like a playground imbecile, recent history has shown that North Korean regime is rational--cold and heartless, but rational. Since the regime’s top priority is self preservation, its behavior can be influenced by affecting its strategic calculus.

Domestic Source of Power is Shifting

Emergence of Market Economy. Although much of economic activity within North Korea is still controlled by the regime, a rudimentary market for petty merchants that began during the famine in the 1990’s has expanded and had become an irreversible fact of North Korea’s economic reality. As well, recent reforms were instituted that allow state-run enterprises and their workers to keep a portion of the profits in order to incentivize higher levels of productivity. Farmers have been incentivized to be more productive by, for example, being able to rotate their crops and use more efficient fertilizing methods. All these changes have noticeably shifted the North Korean economy towards a more market-oriented model, albeit a very small and underdeveloped one.
More Dependent on Outside World. With the loss of artificial support after the Soviet bloc collapsed, the regime’s ability to sustain itself has become more dependent on the outside world, even if it involves smuggling and criminality. China and Russia are willing to prop up the regime, but only as far as to prevent regime collapse and a few other quid-pro-quo trades. So the North Korean regime can't rely on China and Russia similarly to how it depended on the Soviet Union in the past. By now the regime’s Juche self-reliance policy of isolation is basically empty rhetoric.
More Dependent on Population For Income. Despite officially still being a communist state with no right to private property, a domestic market-based economic system has developed which the regime manages like a protection racket. As well, the regime is able to profit from its own population by sending them abroad to work as migrant laborers and skimming most of their wages. Considering that these laborers have few rights and are heavily monitored, such practice could be compared to slavery. Except that many of these slaves see this as a good opportunity given how much worse it tends to be back home. All in all, the regime is still firmly in control. But dependence on its own population for economic benefits is a big change from a complete top-down command economy of the past. This is a big change since the days of the Cold War when the regime didn't depend on its population for economic benefits, but on the contrary was the source of all economic benefits flowing to its population in a top-down controlled manner.
Influence Comes More From Controlling Economic Resources. The regime encourages and rewards activities that increase the regime’s revenues both domestically and abroad. Top military leaders have openly fought for the control of sources of economic opportunity.
Style of Authoritarianism Shifting From Stalin/Mao Totalitarianism Towards Military-Dominated Kleptocracy. Although the regime is still Stalinist and repressive towards its population, the way the regime wields power is dependent on Kleptocratic allocation of economic resources and keeping the military happy. If things continue on the same path, it’s possible that such rentier distribution methods may expand into the lower echelons of society as well, at which point the character of the regime would shift from something like Mao’s China towards something like Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Although both types of regimes are unsavory, the way one deals with them is quite different.

Sanctions & Isolation Measures Are Having An Effect

Recent history has shown that measures which put pressure and isolate the North Korean regime are having a noticeable effect.

Screwing Over Partners. North Korea is known to screw over not just adversaries, but also allies and partners when the temptation is too big. Take the example of Orascom, an Egyptian telecom provider. In 2008 it helped North Korea establish a 3G wireless network called Koryolink, but North Korea refused to pay Orascom the agreed fees. Prioritizing short term gain in a way that hinders future opportunities may be a sign of economic desperation in light of UN Security Council and other sanctions against the North Korean regime. If the North Korean regime wasn't affected by such economic pressure, it probably wouldn't be willing to screw over its own partners just to get some temporary short-term benefits which reduce economic opportunities in the future.
Embassy Closures. Going back to the 1990’s North Korea has closed some of its foreign embassies because their maintenance wasn’t worth the cost to the regime. If the economic sanctions and other measures that were placed on the regime were the driver behind these embassy closures, then it’s yet another sign that the bite of the sanctions are indeed being felt even if the regime is able to circumvent some of them through smuggling.

Regime's Ability to Control Narrative Declining, But Still High

Population is Exercising More Agency. Many North Koreans had to rely on themselves to prevent starving to death in the 1990's instead of relying solely on regime’s handouts. Private market activity and economic incentives lead to practical decision making instead of blindly obeying commands. The more people are able to control their own lives, even if through small petty market activities, the less their mind can be controlled by a paternal Orwellian system.
Glaring Contradictions to the Regime’s Narrative Increasing
- Socialist Rhetoric vs Capitalist Reality. Regime talks about socialism, but private markets are allowed and necessary for people to feed themselves.
- Egalitarian Rhetoric vs Parasitic Reality. The regime talks about shared sacrifices, but the Supreme Leader is portly while many commoners are malnourished. This fact can’t be glossed over or Photoshopped away.
- Foreign vs Domestic Products. Foreign products that are smuggled into North Korea are of such higher quality and presentation compared to the domestically-produced items, that they themselves serve as glaring proof of the inferiority of the domestic system. Anything from clothes to chewing gum sourced from South Korea, China or anywhere else with a vibrant market based economy, serve as a salient reminder that despite the regime’s pronouncements, the outside world is doing some things better than the North Korean regime.
- Alternative Cognitive Muscle Memory. The reality of everyday life is forcing people to transition from a simple Stalinist system to having to maintain 2 contradictory narratives in their heads at the same time--namely playing along with the simplistic communist cultish narratives while at the same time participating in capitalist market activities, trying to accumulate money, paying bribes, and being witness to the fact that what keeps the system afloat is not just ideology but also economics. Human beings can act duplicitously for a very long time both to themselves and to the outside environment. But that doesn’t change the fact that the way people view themselves and how the world works must still shift compared to the past.
- Falling Over Itself. Sometimes the regime messes up so grandly, that it has to backtrack on its own pronouncements, like it did during the botched currency revaluation in 2009 during which the regime had to change the currency conversion limits several times in response to signs of public unrest. China had to respond by mobilizing its military near the border in case the botched revaluation leads to social unrest and regime collapse. The regime blamed the affair on the overseer of the revaluation, who was executed. The regime carried on, but its currency became virtually worthless as people wanted to store their wealth in foreign currencies which are outside the regime’s ability to mess around. It’s hard to maintain the mirage of Socialist awesomeness when the people don’t even want to use the domestic currency that contains the pictures of the Supreme Leaders, and instead prefer the capitalist bourgeois cash money sweet $Benjamins$.
Ability to Isolate the Population From Foreign Influences Decreasing. A couple of generations ago, people could communicate across borders mainly via mail, landline telephone, and by physically traveling. Today there’s many more ways to communicate, including wireless communications, drones, and cheap portable media that can be easily smuggled or otherwise transferred across the border en masse. Some North Koreans today are able to watch South Korean TV programs, listen to KPop music, and obtain Western-style consumer products smuggled from the outside. The barriers to communicating and interacting with the outside world are much weaker than in the past.
Regime’s Ability to Impose Its Will Is Still High
- Cult of personality, gulags, and all the expected artifacts of a Stalinist regime are still in place.
- 3-tier Songbun caste system, by which the population is divided based on ancestral socio-economic status, is still in place.
- Petty merchants who are able to feed and clothe themselves are far from being a vibrant middle class.
- People’s ability to experience the outside world is still low.
- People’s ability to be in change of their own existence is still low.
- Regime has so far been able to withstand every internal challenge to itself, from disgruntled military units to dynastic squabbles.

Implications

North Korea is More Influenceable From Outside Since End of Cold War

China and Russia ensure that the North Korean regime doesn’t collapse. But that support comes not from a strategic multilateral alliance like the old Soviet bloc, but stems from their own individual strategic interests. The level of the support and the conditions for getting it are subject to the patron’s decisions oriented around their own unique interests and cannot be relied upon indefinitely like a deep strategic multilateral pact. As a result, North Korea can’t rely on them for regime’s long term viability and has to make do on its own as well. Indeed it is this circumstance that makes the regime rely on threatening others with destruction in order to secure economic and other benefits. On the other hand, the regime’s inescapable dependence on the outside world makes it more influenceable from the outside.

Nevertheless It's Unrealistic to Expect Regime to Wither Away By Itself

If the regime hasn’t collapsed since the Cold War’s end almost 3 decades ago, then there’s no longer any good reason to expect it to do so on its own. The regime has survived a mass famine, chronic internal systemic dysfunction, internal factional rivalries, coup attempts, 2 dynastic successions, and has China and Russia making sure that the regime doesn’t collapse. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” and Obama’s “Strategic Patience” strategies relied on the regime to either collapse under the weight of its own contradictions or cry uncle and capitulate. Instead the regime stuck around and developed yet more powerful WMDs. These lessons of recent history should be taken to heart.

Questions the Regime Is Grappling With

Follow the China Model?

Should it follow the China model of seeking legitimacy through economic growth instead of just coercion, while keeping the political system authoritarian? Perhaps the Vietnam model? Or stick to the current course?

How to Reform Without Tripping?

How to develop both economically and militarily while maintaining domestic social controls? Reforming a system that is rigid and relies on coercion without triggering systemic collapse is tricky.

How to Get the Most From America?

How to have it both ways--get security guarantees and economic benefits from America without fully relinquishing WMD capabilities just in case?

What Regime Is Pursuing

Detente With USA

If it had no other choice with no options to cheat, North Korea would probably give up WMDs and overall belligerence in exchange for America’s security guarantees and economic aid, just like they say they would.

Adapt But Preserve

The regime aims to navigate domestically in a way that raises economic productivity while keeping the structures of social controls as little changed as possible.

IV. Relevant Parties & Their Positions

The standoff on the Korean peninsula involves the participation of 6 main players: North Korea, South Korea, USA, China, Japan and Russia. This section explains each of their perspectives on the conflict and on each other.

South Korea

Although various South Korean administrations had different approaches to the North Korean problem, a few things remain constant.

Goals

Security. Since the Cold War ended, the conflict between South Korea and the North is less to do with a battle of ideological systems (Capitalism vs Communism). The collapse of the Soviet bloc has put that question to rest. Today's situation is more about a lagging North Korea that wants to sustain itself through blackmail and threats. As such, the situation is no longer about resisting the Communist scourge, and more about how to deal with a dangerous toddler that may cause havoc if it’s not given a pacifier.
Eventual Korean Unification. Like with German unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it’s expected that in the long term both Koreas would reunite into a single Korea that existed prior to the artificial partition after WW2. Although both north and south developed under completely different conditions and have acquired distinct cultural aspects, the two are still considered to constitute a single people. For many in South Korea, attacking the North, whether justifiably or not, would be like attacking one’s own people. The path to unification is long and uncertain, but the end goal is not in dispute. South Korea is willing to play the long game and cajole the situation to a positive outcome by actively engaging with North Korea and America to pursue detente.
Unlock Economic Opportunities. For all intents and purposes, South Korea is an island nation because its only land border is with a hostile North Korea with which it’s separated by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is among the most militarized borders in the world. At the same time South Korea is among the most export dependent nations. If the security issues on the Korean peninsula can be resolved, then South Korea can pursue joint regional economic projects by which it can diversify its energy sources by importing natural gas through from Russia, through North Korea, that’s cheaper then the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) that it’s currently importing from the Middle East. As well, if the transportation systems between Russia and the Korean peninsula can be linked up, then South Korea could export its products to the European market faster and cheaper through Russia by land instead of by the more expensive sea or air.

Perspective on Others

North Korea. Both Koreas started as a single unified country, but after the Soviet-USA joint occupation of Korea the two regions digressed much in their socio-political development. The newer South Korean generations tend to view the North as a separate people by now, whereas the older generations often see the 2 Koreas as the same people divided by the realpolitik of WW2 and the Cold War. In any case, South Korea clearly recognizes that North Korea is its chief security threat, even if they are brothers from another mother. There isn’t a military option available to South Korea (or the USA for that matter) to resolve the North Korean threat without a high risk of mass casualties on all sides. Therefore, since the Cold War ended, South Korea has been seeking to engage North Korea like an older brother would who wants to be a positive influence on the wayward younger brother and effecting his behavior through positive reinforcement. South Korea sees it in its interests to help America and North Korea reach a detente. Nevertheless, one must be ready to dole out a thrashing if necessary to defend oneself, and South Korea has heavily invested in such capabilities, in cooperation with America, if the worst case scenario materializes.
USA. South Korea recognizes that detente on the Korean peninsula is chiefly dependent on the dynamic between North Korea and America, and its own security is tied to the American security umbrella. South Korea has probably the most to lose from war on the Korean peninsula and seeks to influence both the North and America towards detente. For that aim it would prefer American policy to be more nuanced instead of trying to muscle its way with the North and for America to take more queues from the South regarding regional security issues.
China. South Korea for the most part agrees with China in that it doesn’t see a complete cutoff of the North Korean regime from external sources of economic sustenance as a way to resolve the standoff with the North. Nevertheless, South Korea would like to see China use its influence to pressure the North to seek a less belligerent path instead of using the North as a convenient tool in its larger regional ambitions or broader competition with America. Although South Korea would ideally prefer Korea to be eventually united under a single South-led system, it will also consider it a huge improvement if the North simply decided to follow the China or Vietnam models whereby economic growth is used instead of repression for legitimacy, even if the political system remains authoritarian, so that the regime would have less incentive to act belligerently. South Korea sees China’s attempts at nudging the North towards its own model as a net positive. It also sees overall regional economic integration with China, Russia and Japan, as a net positive. Nevertheless, South Korea doesn’t view the Chinese propping of the North Korean regime as always helpful, even if Chinese regional heft means that South Korea can’t do much about it.
Russia. South Korea sees Russian involvement in the affairs on the Korean peninsula as a net positive. Like South Korea, Russia wants to see a constructive resolution to the standoff on the Korean peninsula. Both nations would benefit from natural gas flows from Russia to the Korean peninsula and from further regional economic integration in Northeast Asia. Like the case with South Korea’s views on China, South Korea would also like Russian relationship with North Korea to be one where Russia uses its influence with the North to only influence its behavior towards de-belligerence instead of also for wider geopolitical ambitions to counter America, which makes resolving the North Korean problem harder.
Japan. On paper South Korea’s and Japan's interests should be very closely aligned, and regarding the North Korean threat they are. Both countries are within reach of North Korea’s weapons. However, close security based cooperation between them is precluded because Japan’s post-WW2 military is constitutionally limited, and South Korea’s perception (as shared by many others including China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and others) is that Japan hasn’t sufficiently atoned for its brutality prior and during WW2. Until the 2 nations reconcile regarding this issue, not only will they not be able to cooperate comprehensively regarding the North Korean threat, but South Korea wouldn’t be comfortable for Japan to be more militarily involved in any East Asian security matters.

China

Goals

Peaceful Resolution of Korean Standoff. China doesn’t want instability on the Korean peninsula whether due to war or regime collapse because either would destabilize the region, cause economic damage, create mass refugee flows into China, and get China’s chief global rival America to be more involved in the region.
Keep American Influence At Bay & Promote Itself as Leader on Regional Affairs. Although China isn’t as brazen or backward as North Korea, it shares the North’s need to keep Western-style influences at bay in order to protect its own authoritarian domestic political system. There are enough mutually-incompatible systemic differences between China one one side, and America and the Western world on the other side, that China sees it in its own interests to push against Western norms, particularly in its own backyard.

Perspective on Others

North Korea. China’s preference is for North Korea to ideally become a mini-China: a growth oriented authoritarian regime, but without the antics that attract American involvement.
USA. China wants America to take what North Korea regime is saying at face value and give North Korea security guarantees and economic aid in return for North Korea’s de-belligerence. While at it, also for America to remove its military presence from the Korean peninsula. Overall, China would love nothing more then for America to become an isolationist nation and leave the Asian region for Chinese sole domination. More realistically, China wants the Korean standoff to be resolved in a way that preserves North Korea as a buffer between Western liberal influences and itself. China will maneuver in the Korean context, as well as others, to present itself as an alternative platform to Western liberalism.
South Korea. China recognizes South Korea’s security dilemma and shares South Korea's support for a detente between North Korea and America. Other then the immediate Korean security standoff, China would like the South to be part of its broad regional strategy in which it aims to place itself at the central dominating position. China wants there to be fewer reasons for South Korea and America to continue their close military relationship. A detente between America and North Korea would raise the prospects for that.
Japan. Like with South Korea, China recognizes Japanese security concerns regarding North Korea, especially since among the North Korean stunts was launching a missile over Japanese territory. Without detente between America and North Korea and with continuing North Korean belligerence, Japan may decide to revise its constitution to allow for full militarization beyond the self defense limitation placed after WW2. This wouldn’t be in Chinese strategic interests because it would increase the military capabilities of a nation whose strategic posture is firmly within the opposing American camp.
Russia. The China-Russia relationship is key to the North Korea issue, as well as to broader East Asian security, because China and Russia are North Korea’s chief patrons, and are the only ones that are willing to substantively resist measures by America and the wider international community to isolate the North Korean regime. However, their support for North Korea and their relationship with each other isn’t on equal terms. Regarding the standoff on the Korean peninsula, China expects Russia to defer to it on Korea related issues. In terms of the broader China-Russia relationship, both China and Russia have an interest in resisting liberal democratic norms and the American-led international order. This common interest comes into play regarding their support for the North Korean regime. However, there are differences that, at least so far, have prevented a comprehensive multifaceted strategic alliance between China and Russia. Understanding their relationship with each other is key to understanding their role in the North Korean issue.
- China Expects Russia’s Deference On East Asian Matters. China expects that although Russia is another patron to North Korea besides China, it would never replace China as THE patron for North Korea. In turn, China defers to Russia on Eastern European matters. Regarding Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, China has stated that it supports territorial integrity of any nation, but otherwise stayed out of the issue. It seems that Russia has so far acquiesced to Chinese preferences in East Asia. If Russia ever decided to support the North Korean regime beyond the level that China is comfortable with, it would be an interesting dynamic to watch. It would also be interesting to know what China thinks about Russian economic interests in the region that includes, besides the usual providing of Russian hydrocarbons, a Russian transportation link between South Korea and Europe that could be in competition with Chinese Belt-and-Road Initiative. Most likely Russian transport links wouldn’t be as extensive as the Chinese ones, and so would be in addition to and not in direct competition with, the Chinese strategic platform. But as China is fully aware, Russia, especially under Vladimir Putin, will squeeze as much advantage from an improvement in strategic position as possible, and so would be eyeing any Russian transport platforms between South Korea and Europe with interest. One thing that could shed light on how much Russia is making sure not to piss China off is it’s trade with North Korea after China banned coal imports from North Korea in 2017. Supposedly Russia increased its own trade with North Korea to replace the lost trade with China. If this is accurate, then it raises an important question: was this a coordinated move by China and Russia to make it seem like China is putting pressure on North Korea in response to American demands without actually doing so by winking at Russia to replace the economic patronage that was lost from China? Or was this Russia doing things unilaterally with North Korea without China’s approval? The answer to this question would be a telling indicator of how much Russia’s activities with North Korea are bound by China’s wishes, and therefore whether isolating North Korea requires negotiating and coordinating with China only or if it also requires including Russia as well.
- Russia Has Little To Offer To China. There is little that Russia has to offer to China beyond a shared anti-Americanism. China is a huge nation that’s growing fast. Russia, on the other hand, is slowly declining in terms of population, education levels and relative competitiveness of its domestic industrial base except for computer hacking. There are several things that Russia has going for it. Russia has a diversified and highly competent security services honed during the heyday of Soviet Union by the need to control the domestic population as well as to influence external developments. These services brought under its umbrella much of Russian mafias during the turbulent 1990’s, and the usage of spycraft for political goals bloomed further under Putin’s rule in the 2000’s, himself a former spy. As well, Russia dominates European hydrocarbon markets, which is Russia’s most important strategic geolocation. In addition to nuclear weapons, which aren’t expected to be used except for most dire of circumstances, Russia has little else that Russia has going for it, and China knows this. So whatever strategic cooperation there is between China and Russia, it’s heavily favored towards China as there is little that Russia has to offer China other than being an additional source of anti-Americanism and anti-liberalism.
- Tactical Goals Aren’t Always Aligned. Russia’s brazen actions aren’t always to China’s preference, as can be seen by Russian influence operations that tipped the American Presidential election towards Trump in 2016, whereas China would have preferred Hillary Clinton to be the President instead. Trump’s platform (in as much as it can be called that) included strong anti-Chinese rhetoric, especially regarding the balance of trade and China’s theft of American technologies and intellectual property. Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, would probably have been less overtly antagonizing towards the Chinese in terms of trade. But Putin strongly preferred Trump. It’s an open fact by now that Russian spies and hackers had enough of an influence on the American electorate that just a few percentage point swing towards Trump was all that was needed to influence the results of a close election.
- Different Preferences Regarding International Order. There is another major difference between China and Russia, and it has to do with how they relate to international institutions and platforms. Putin’s regime in Russia seeks to undermine the Western liberal international order, whereas China depends on it and prefers to replace America as the chief hegemon. That has implications for how the 2 countries behave on the international stage and how they articulate their own interests.
  - China Depends on Well Functioning International Trade System; Russia Just Wants To Sell Hydrocarbons. The ratio of Russia’s domestic natural resources per person is very high because, among other reasons, Russia is the biggest country in the world in terms of geographical area but has only the 9th highest population. Therefore Russia is relatively resource rich on a per capita basis and can sell the extra resources abroad. Russia doesn’t depend on international economic institutions much beyond being able to sell natural resources over the border and being able to get paid for it.
  - Putin’s Russia Is Short-Term Gangsterish; China Is Playing The Long Game. A key pillar of Putin’s hold on power, like Kim Jong Un’s in North Korea, depends on a population that, whether through propaganda or good ol’ coercion, sees the top strongman and his system in good light or at least acquiesces to it. The level of Orwellianism is obviously much more drastic in North Korea then in Russia. North Korea at the outset was a social blank slate ripe for a brutal cult of personality whereas Russia, except for Stalin’s reign, is a more cosmopolitan nation and had some muscle memory with representative democracy after the Cold War’s end, albeit a very chaotic and gangsterish one. Socio-political developments near Russia’s western border in Europe, where most of the Russian population resides, that put a dent in authoritarian narratives--like Ukraine’s and Georgia’s moves toward the West or the consolidation of the European Union--are strategic setbacks for Putin’s way of managing things domestically in Russia. Therefore, Putin’s calculus is biased towards proactive action and the undermining of liberal democratic systems globally, of which America and the European Union are the chief ones. In contrast, China has the highest population in the world, 8x as high as Russia’s, but only half the size. Therefore, China’s level of self sufficiency in terms of resources is much lower than Russia’s, and its dependence on international trade for economic viability is much higher than Russia’s. Therefore, China doesn’t share Russia’s willingness to undermine liberal Western institutions, because unlike for Russia, this would be somewhat like shooting oneself in the foot. It’s not in China’s interest to destroy the America-led order, but to replace America as the main geopolitical center of gravity. China doesn’t want to simply destroy Western global platforms, but to take it over and influence it in a more authoritarian Chinese way that suits the external and domestic interests of China’s system. Russia under a Putin, on the other hand, would be happy if Western international norms would wither away even if nothing comes in their place.
- Shared Anti-Americanism. Despite their differences, both China and Russia agree on the undesirability of a strong American presence on the global stage, and hence their cooperation of convenience as witnessed by their often coordinated efforts to block or dilute UN Security Council measures related to North Korea, Iran, and other matters.
- Dating With No Prospect of Marriage. All in all, the Chinese and Russian MO is quite different. To the usually cautious and conservative Chinese political establishment, Russia’s brazen actions often seem as uncouth as much as they are impressive. One only has to listen to the over-the-top undiplomatic diatribes of senior Russian diplomats to understand the level of pressure that Putin and Russia’s siloviki put on them in terms of policy and narrative. But that doesn’t change the fact that both Russia and China share strong anti-Americanism, and that puts them in bed together, even if there’s isn’t much prospect (at least not yet) of a full marriage.

Russia

Goals

Hydrocarbon Profits. South Korea would be an excellent market for Russia to sell its hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas via a pipeline from Russia through North Korea. Being an island nation for all practical purposes with few domestic natural resources, South Korea is forced to import a huge portion of its energy resources via expensive Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) shipments from faraway places like the Middle East. It would be substantially cheaper for South Korea to instead get its natural gas through an overland pipeline from Russia. As well it would help diversify South Korea’s energy sources to reduce the risks associated with interruption of supply due to political instability in the Middle East and other places. Russia finds this prospect a very profitable one. However, none of this is possible while the North Korea standoff continues.
Logistics Platform Between East Asia and Europe. Russia hopes to integrate its domestic rail networks, which stretch from Europe to East Asia, with the Korean peninsula. This would, theoretically, make the transport of goods by the main East Asian exporters, South Korea and Japan, to the European market much cheaper and faster then by ship. Russia stands to benefit both economically and strategically from being the platform that facilitates such transport. Like with hydrocarbon sales, transportation links require a resolution to the military standoff on the Korean peninsula.
Keep American Influence At Bay. Like China, Russia is pushing against American and Western influence wherever it can, especially after Putin smelled blood in the water for the liberal international norms around the time of the Global Financial Crisis starting in 2007 and Western non-interference during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. Putin’s calculus shifted further towards proactive action regarding countering Western influences after domestic Russian protests against his seeking 3rd term of office as President in 2011 which he loudly claimed was a conspiracy on the part of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and a cabal of Western liberal no-goodniks, and went into overdrive after Ukraine tried to ditch Russian domination for good during the EuroMaidan protests in 2013. If Putin let Ukraine rupture the umbilical cord with Russia, Putin’s position domestically would have suffered greatly, especially among the siloviki. A prosperous and liberal Ukraine would have served as a glaring example to the Russian population, which is socially very close to Ukraine, that there’s alternatives to Putin’s methods of maintaining social order within Russia. From the perspective of an average Russian citizen, a British parliamentary system that has functioned for centuries wouldn’t serve as a good model to follow as much as a liberal Ukraine. A faraway place like UK is an academic abstraction, whereas Ukrainians are cousins of Russia with similar language, religion and history. Many Russians have family members who live in Ukraine and communicate with them easily and often. Considering how much Putin relies on ethno-religious propaganda to justify his way of managing things, the prospect of an independent liberal Kievan Rus could irreversibly infect the Russian population with higher expectations, and that would threaten his domestic position. So he saw little choice but to react with a hybrid war against Ukraine, the EU and America--almost like an ongoing massive and multidisciplinary spy operation (the tools one learns as a spy often carry over into other spheres even after the spying career is over). Within the Korean standoff, Russia is also maneuvering in the same regard, but defers to China in East Asian affairs in return to China deferring to Russia on Eastern European affairs. Barring any fundamental changes in the Russia-China relationship, Russian activity in East Asia will probably not go beyond what China prefers, but will still include a sizable dose of anti-Westernism.

Perspective on Others

North Korea. Russia prefers North Korea to be more oriented around economic growth instead of belligerence. Russia prefers for North Korea and USA to reach some kind of understanding, or more preferably a full detente, in order to get past the security issues and open the way for economic projects that benefit Russia’s economic and strategic interests. Outside of those things, Russia prefers for the North Korea domestic model to remain authoritarian, so as to remain birds of a feather with Putin, and to keep it dependent on Russia for economic and strategic sustenance.
China. Russia’s room for maneuvering in East Asia is limited by Chinese preferences. China is Russia’s main partner in countering Western influences. Unlike Russia, China’s strategic position is growing stronger. Last thing Russia wants to do is make China unhappy, especially in its own backyard. That said, in case of detente between America and North Korea opens the way for economic joint projects in the region, it’ll be interesting to see how China will react to Russia’s pursuit of becoming a transport platform between East Asia and Europe that would compete with China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative.
South Korea. Relations between South Korea and Russia are cordial and businesslike. Both recognize that the other is in a different global camp. South Korea is solidly within the Western liberal democratic camp whereas Russia is the loudest antagonizer against it. Nevertheless, both South Korea and Russia accept that they have mutually compatible economic interests which could be pursued if North Korean belligerence is resolved in a peaceful way. For Russia specifically, such prospects give Russia a chance to raise the weight of its imprint on global affairs, like it has done in Europe with the help of its dominant position as the main hydrocarbon supplier to many European countries.
Japan. Like with South Korea, Russia recognizes that Japan is solidly within the opposing liberal democratic camp led by America. Nevertheless Japan and Russia are in close proximity to each other and there are potential common economic interests that may be pursued, though the fruit may not be as low hanging as with South Korea. But while North Korea makes threats and flies missiles over Japan, the top priority will remain North Korea’s threatening behavior.
USA. Russia sees the America as its chief global rival. Russia supports a detente between North Korea and America, but mainly in order to unlock economic opportunities once the security issues are out of the way, and in order to give America less reason to maintain military and strategic presence in the region.

Japan

Goals

Security. Japan’s chief goal with regard to the North Korean standoff is a peaceful resolution to the hostilities. Although Japan doesn’t share a land border with North Korea like South Korea does, Japan is still within the reach of North Korea’s weapons, as witnessed during the several provocative North Korean missile launches over Japanese territory. Another key difference between South Korea and Japan is that unlike the former, the latter doesn’t share a national identity with the population of North Korea. Regardless, both Japan and South Korea are located close to North Korea and both are under the American security umbrella. Therefore, both are potential targets for North Korea in its standoff with America. Since the end of WW2, Japan’s military capabilities were constitutionally limited to self-defense only. If Japan decides to change its constitution and pursue a full fledged military on par with other powers, then it may unnerve South Korea, and even more so China, which could raise tensions region-wide and perhaps even an arms race. Currently the number of China’s nuclear weapons are just a handful compared with USA and Russia. However, if Japan decided to develop nuclear weapons in response to the threat from North Korea, then Chinese ambition to dominate the region would face an additional difficulty, and so China may ramp up its own nuclear weapons. In response, South Korea wouldn’t want to be left behind either and develop its own weapons. An arms race could ensue with implications for America, its role in the region, and its bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea. Japan’s challenge is to deftly navigate these considerations while ensuring its own security. Like with South Korea, the most viable path for Japan would be a detente between North Korea and America. Japan would welcome a change in the situation such that it’s no longer in the crossfire of North Korea because of what North Korea wants from America.

Perspective on Others

North Korea. North Korea is Japan’s chief security threat. But there’s more to the story than the threat of WMDs. There are several 100,000’s of Koreans living in Japan, called Zainichi Koreans, who descended from those who remained in Japan from the times of Japanese colonialism. Many of these Zainichi Koreans support North Korea. Originally they were an ethnic community that found it difficult to prosper within Japanese rigid homogeneous society after WW2, and therefore were sympathetic to communist proletarian ideology. North Korean regime used this community in Japan for strategic leverage such as spying, propaganda, human trafficking, smuggling, collecting remittance payments and the like. This community formed an organization, Chongryon, which in absence of official diplomatic relationship between North Korea and Japan, serves as a defacto embassy of the former within the territory of the latter. As the systemic and humanitarian failings of the North Korean socio-political system became glaringly obvious over the decades, the Zainichi Korean community in Japan, especially the younger generations, became less monolithic. Japanese society itself became more prosperous, liberal, and more accepting of foreigners as time went by. Over time the discrimination against Koreans in Japan has greatly subsided. A new Zainichi Korean organization was formed, called Mindan, which supports South Korea. Today, it’s estimated that around ⅔ of the Zainichi Koreans are pro-South. However, that still leaves a sizable portion of North supporters, some of whom are a continuing security challenge to Japan.
South Korea. Japan and South Korea have a lot in common. Both are developed liberal democracies with heavy dependence on international trade. Both have a close relationship with America, whose security umbrella guarantees security for them both. However, their direct relationship with each other, particularly in terms of direct military cooperation, is limited by historical differences related to Japanese brutal treatment of Korea during the 1st half of the 20th century prior to Japanese defeat by America in the Pacific War. Despite prior agreements and Japanese reparations, this historical wound hasn’t fully healed in South Korea, nor in many other Asian countries that fell victim to Japanese militancy during the Imperial era. Japanese leaders have issued numerous apologetic statements and claim that today’s Japan would never do such things again. But, as we believe, the gestures were not sufficiently salient to the regular people in South Korea and other countries. Hence, there is domestic political pressure in South Korea to keep relations with Japan at arm's length. This issue will be dealt with more in the section “Reducing the Threat”. There are also territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan over the claims to 2 sets of islands in the waters between them. The possibilities for tensions between Japan and South Korea as a result of these disputes are probably much less than the potential for tension between Japan and China as a result of a territorial dispute about a set of islands between Japan and China. But it’s still another stumbling block that prevents the South Korea-Japan relationship from becoming deeper and closer.
USA. Japan has a long and close relationship with America. Like South Korea, Japan would be all for measures that reduce the security threats in the region through peaceful means, whether through detente between North Korea and America or anything else. Like South Korea, Japan would prefer a more predictable and less indulgent rhetoric from US Presidents, like George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” or Donald Trump’s “Fire and Fury”, and more focus on substantive progress regarding regional security.
China. China and Japan are the #2 and #3 largest economies in the world (America being #1). They are located close to each other and economic ties between them are very thick. However, politically they are often at odds, with Japan being a liberal democracy under the American security umbrella and China being an illiberal authoritarian state, even if economically China threw in the towel in the Capitalism-vs-Communism battle of ideologies decades ago. Like South Korea, China generally feels that Japan never fully atoned for its past colonial brutality like Germany has over the Holocaust and WW2. Chinese casualties at the hands of the Japanese were of similar magnitude as Russia’s casualties from Hitler’s aggression. So naturally, China is distrustful of the prospect of Japanese rearmament. Additionally, there are ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and China regarding a set of strategically located islands in the seas between them. On a related note, China is in a protracted conflict with several other nearby nations about the claims to the South China Sea, and the dispute with Japan over these islands is additional fuel to the fire of East Asian geopolitics.
Russia. Like with China, Japan’s relations with Russia involve a good dose of cordiality combined with recognition of key differences. As a relic of 20th century imperial competition between Russia and Japan, there’s (surprise surprise) a territorial dispute between them about who has the claim to a chain of islands between northern Japan and Russia’s Kamchatka peninsula. This dispute is not, at least yet, of high intensity and just sits there as an unresolved matter. Japan’s economic relationship with Russia is nowhere near the level of trade with China, but they are both all for closer ties, especially if it helps to coordinate East Asian security matters to peaceful ends.

USA

Goals

Security
- Resolution to the Korean Standoff. America wants for North Korea to stop threatening America and its allies. Ideally North Korea would reform and become similar to South Korea. But more realistically, the regime could pursue a China or Vietnam models which rely on economic growth for domestic legitimacy instead of isolation and repression. At the very least, even if the regime stayed the same but simply stopped threatening others, that would be a huge improvement as well.
- Prevent Proliferation of WMDs. America is concerned about the risk of global proliferation of WMDs, especially since the 9/11 attacks. North Korea’s trade in weapons technology with unsavory regimes like Syria, Iran, and Pakistan is part of that problem. Another concerning prospect is the possibility of North Korea selling weapon capabilities to terrorists and other non-state actors.
Promote Common Set of Rules
- Follow Through On the Pivot To Asia. It would be in America’s interests to be more involved in East Asian affairs and act as a facilitator of regional orderliness. East Asia is among the most populous and economically growing regions that came out of the ashes of 20th century wars and ideological battles, embracing market-based economic systems and regional integration. The region will continue to attract global strategic attention, and America doesn’t want to be on the sidelines. In fact, this is the central notion behind Obama's “Pivot to Asia”, though Trump’s trashing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) didn’t do that strategy any favors. Most likely the rest of the Pacific nations that continued on with the TPP hope that after Trump is out of office the American Presidency will return to adult hands and the original plan for TPP will restart. As of now there’s no good alternative to American leadership in East Asian affairs. The only country with the heft to fill such a role is China, an authoritarian state, albeit one with whom one can have business like relations, that’s a participant and propagator of regional conflicts like in the South China Sea. Most of East Asian nations would much prefer American leadership instead which, despite the seeping in of sometimes unhelpful influence of domestic commercial special interests into America’s foreign policy, is considered relatively benign when compared to China’s. Which brings us to the next point...
- Meet the Challenge From China. In chemistry the internal structure of a molecule defines its function and how it interacts with other molecules. Although the domain of human relations is more complex and nuanced, there are nevertheless similar dynamics in play, especially at large aggregate levels like societies and nation states, whereby the character of a nation’s domestic socio-political system affects how the nation interacts with other nations. China thankfully received the memo in the 1970’s after Mao’s death that communist command economy leads to disaster, and reformed its economic system accordingly. However, China’s socio-political system retained much of its authoritarianism even if it let go of a cult of personality, though even that has made a partial comeback under the reign of Xi Jinping. All this has an effect beyond China’s borders. Being a 1-party authoritarian state, the type of people that wind up in positions of leadership along with the nature of their activities aren’t influenced by elections or by having to gain domestic popular approval, but by the internal set of informal and emergent rules within the party machinery that rewards economic development and loyalty, and results in high levels of factionalism and intra-party competition. Although the level of straight up gangsterism is probably not as high as within Russia, the gloves do sometimes come off, as can be observed by the high profile takedowns of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang by Xi Jinping. Another telling thing about the Chinese domestic socio-political system is its “social credit” system by which citizens are rated based on how much the government deems their activities in line with the party preferences using their digital footprint like social network activities, financial history, literary habits, travel history and the like, and based on that doles out perks and punishments like access to schools, jobs, and even access to matchmaking services. The program is in the pilot phase, but already includes millions of people whose participation is mandatory. The type of political leadership that can proceed with such Orwellian domestic initiatives tend to play less nice with other countries because their room for action is less constrained by domestic realities and the paths by which they got to the top often involve very sharp elbows. Such a domestic socio-political system is incentivized to keep Western liberal cultural influences at bay lest they raise the people’s expectations for how they are governed. Since America is the Western nation with the most global reach, including China’s Asian backyard, such anti-Westernism translates to anti-Americanism. If Chinese domestic socio-political system was a liberal representative one, then perhaps a rising China wouldn’t feel as much need to counter liberal influences, or perhaps the countries could more easily coexist and compete on similar footing, like say, Germany and France in Europe. Of course, neither China nor America want conflict, but the difference in the 2 countries’ domestic socio-political systems makes smooth sailing more difficult. America’s shift of attention to Asia aims to meet that challenge in the most effective and smoothest way possible while establishing multilateral ties across the region to promote a common set of rules. The situation is still unfolding, and there are many opportunities for cooperation and shared understandings between America and China. More so than is likely between America and Russia, unless Putin decides to change course. Let’s see what the future holds.

Perspective on Others

North Korea. The most immediate threat to America from the Korean standoff is North Korea’s capability to deliver a WMD onto American soil. A nuclear strike requires both a detonatable nuclear warhead and a missile to deliver it. North Korea has tested its nuclear weapons only stationary and on its own soil. So fully determining its capability to deliver nuclear payload over a long distance isn’t straightforward. There are differing reports about whether North Korea’s weapons can already reach America or not. Regardless, their demonstrated capability has been steadily improving. If North Korea can’t reach Guam, Hawaii or Alaska yet, let alone the mainland, if things don’t change they probably will eventually all of the above. America is also concerned with the security of its allies in the region most in line of North Korea’s weapons: South Korea and Japan. Successive American Presidential administrations have tried to deal with the North Korea threat in different ways, ranging from negotiation to staying on the sidelines to making open threats. The closest America got to making a deal was the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and America. But it was too narrow in scope and its implementation was problematic from both sides. After a few years things went back to square one. Today it seems that the Trump administration--after Trump’s twitter storms, bombastic remarks, and contradicting his own diplomats working on the issue--is thankfully working on what seems potentially like a comprehensive deal with North Korea after Trump and Kim Jong-Un met at a summit in Singapore. As of now, things are still in progress.
China. China is America’s top long term challenge. In fact the challenge for both nations is to figure out a way to coexist without falling into conflict and prevent the Thucydides Trap whereby an established power and a rising power often come to blows without competent diplomacy and good effort by both parties to prevent escalation. America’s goal of deftly adjusting to a rising China while preserving its own interests and the interests of a broader Western liberal order comes into play within the context of the Korean standoff. America would like China and Russia to stop propping up the North Korean regime in order to force it to capitulate to international pressure and become less belligerent. But China doesn’t want to risk regime collapse that may ensue which may cause mass refugee flows into China and, if the whole peninsula falls under South Korea's sway, the moving of Western influences right up to Chinese border. If China didn’t worry about encroaching Western influence, there would be more opportunity for coordinated measures between America and China regarding the North Korea issue.
Russia. Like with China, America would prefer for Russia to stop propping up the North Korea regime and to stop using the North Korea context for its broader strategy of countering the American-led international liberal order. Whatever influence Russia has with North Korea that induces it to be less belligerent is welcome. America would prefer for South Korea to buy its natural gas from American suppliers, or at least from those who wouldn’t use their hydrocarbon supplies for geopolitical leverage like Russia. But American pressure in this regard is countered by the sheer economic opportunities for both South Korea and Russia. Russia doesn’t have a hold over the East Asian hydrocarbon market like it does with Eastern and Central Europe. East Asia is important to Russia, but not as much as Eastern Europe. So there are fewer reasons for Russia to pull shenanigans in East Asia like it has done in Europe. So the geostrategic considerations of buying hydrocarbons from Russia is rather straightforward for South Korea. Since both the incentives and limitations that Russia faces in East Asia, its role in the Korean standoff would probably be net-positive for America and South Korea. But Russia’s support for the North Korea regime that pertains to its broader assault on America’s global role and liberal norms is not.
South Korea. America has a close and deep alliance with South Korea. America occupied and administered the southern portion of the peninsula after it beat Japan in WW2. It fought a brutal war in early 1950’s for the benefit of South Korea, and America’s wider Cold War strategy, under official UN auspices along with various allies against North Korea’s aggression that was green-lighted and supported by Stalin and later aided by Mao’s Chinese troops. South Korea and America were part of the same anti-Communist bloc of countries throughout the Cold War and South Korea is under the American security umbrella today. America understands that South Korea has the most to lose if there’s a hot war on the Korean peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War America’s challenge has been how to put pressure on North Korea without making South Korea a drive-by victim. South Korea’s approach towards the North has been more dovish then America’s, though the amount of that difference varied greatly depending on who was in South Korea’s Presidential office. South Korea has extensive military capabilities, but it’s America that has the last word on military matters. America’s challenge regarding South Korea is to make it feel safe in its current position and work together to pursue the common goal of a non-belligerent North Korea while preserving the US-South Korea alliance.
Japan. Like with South Korea, America has a strong relationship with Japan. And like South Korea, Japan is in North Korea’s line of fire. America’s challenge regarding Japan is similar to South Korea in that America would like to reduce the North Korea threat in a way that keeps Japan safe and preserves the US-Japan alliance.

V. What Are the Options?

The standoff on the Korean peninsula involves North Korean threats against South Korea, Japan and America. What can be done to reduce the North Korean threat? Japan is constitutionally precluded from projecting offensive military capabilities after its defeat by America in WW2. South Korea is militarily capable, but is precariously vulnerable to all of North Korea’s military capabilities due to proximity. China and Russia prefer peace on the peninsula, but they don’t see the Korean standoff only on its own terms but also as part of a broader competition with America. That leaves America as the remaining main influencer on the situation, and is in fact the intended audience for North Korea’s belligerence. So what are America’s options? The following is our understanding of the possible paths ahead.

Option 1: Military Attack on North Korea’s WMD Capabilities

Although this option may seen plausible given North Korea’s belligerence and refusal to reform, it is by far the worst option available because, unless all of North Korea’s capabilities are neutralized in a synchronized fashion, it can easily retaliate and cause devastation onto South Korea and Japan and perhaps even American territories. Trump openly threatened to unload “Fire and Fury like the world has never seen” on North Korea if it threatened America (and surely having a prepared plan in this regard is a must just in case), but thankfully he and Kim Jong-Un seemed to find common ground in Singapore, and hopefully are actively pursuing a workable detente. In any case, what are the problems with this option?

High Risk of Large Casualties on Both Sides

Too Many Targets. If the preemptive attack doesn’t eliminate all of North Korea’s WMDs, it can retaliate on South Korean, Japanese and American territories with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The number of targets and the the sheer complexity of such an undertaking are so high that it may not even be possible to target all at once given current military capabilities (though we’re not experts on this issue and may very well be wrong on this).
It’s Not Just WMDs. Even if North Korea’s WMDs are neutralized at the outset, it can quickly retaliate via conventional artillery on South Korea’s largest city Seoul, whose metropolitan area is home to 25m people and is less than 50 miles from North Korea. Estimates of casualties from a full blown conflict vary, but are all unacceptably high: hundred of thousands to millions of deaths on both sides, including civilians and soldiers, 20,000+ of whom are American soldiers already stationed in South Korea. Eliminating both North Korea’s WMDs as well as conventional weapons, such that North Korea won't be able to retaliate against America and its allies, is a tall order.
Extremely High Collateral Damage. Even if North Korea’s threat is quickly eliminated, there’s a large risk that the fallout from their destroyed WMDs (nuclear, chemical and biological) will wreak devastation across the Korean peninsula, and potentially China, Japan and Russia as well.

Would Likely Involve Some or All Cooks in the Kitchen

Any attack, by any side, has too high a chance of escalating into an all out war that will include not just the initial attacking parties, but also China and Russia, who are powerful states that don’t see eye-to-eye on everything with America and its allies. As well, Japan may respond to the breaking out of hostilities by ditching its constitutional limitations on militarization, go nuclear and trigger an arms race in East Asia.

Option 2: Stand By

This option involves waiting out the North Korean regime and hope that its internal systemic problems lead to either collapse or reform. The administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama basically tried this option, but to no avail. The regime has proven to be resilient despite famine, internal political squabbles, and other challenges. Waiting for the regime to cry uncle and capitulate simply resulted in giving it the space to develop yet more powerful weapons.

Option 3: Get China to Cut Economic Lifelines to North Korea

This option involves getting China to cut its lifelines to the North Korean regime and thereby forcing it to be less threatening. This would be a great option if it was realistic. Although China isn’t happy with North Korea and has put pressure on it in the past to cut it out, it simply refuses to remove the economic lifeline to the North Korea regime. Why is that the case? China claims that it fears a humanitarian disaster on its border (though it also wants to keep North Korea as a buffer between the America-led liberal order and China itself). Our opinion is that on balance it’s a credible concern, and therefore, the option of relying on China to cut off its support to the North Korea regime is not a realistic one for addressing the North Korean threat.

How Could Economic Privation Lead to Regime Collapse?

Unable to Structure Incentives Within the Power Hierarchy. If economic isolation is complete enough, then the required economic lubrication needed to keep each of the levels in the hierarchy aligned with the regime is dangerously absent. The calculus of those anywhere on the hierarchy starts to shift from supporting the regime to thinking of Plan B for themselves and those close to them. Such a dynamic can rapidly spread like a run on the bank as members of the power hierarchy start to lose confidence in the regime's ability to hold the power structure in one piece precisely because other members of the hierarchy are losing confidence themselves. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy. Without being able to influence the calculus of those that make up the power hierarchy, the viability of the hierarchy itself would be greatly damaged. The Supreme Leader’s orders will be loud and clear, but may have little effect, at which point it’s goodnight and good luck.
Having to Pick Winners and Losers May Lead To Instability. If the regime’s economic resources are diminished, it may resort to prioritizing some parts of its power hierarchy at the expense of other parts, thus creating losers who may start working against the regime. Unrest at any part of the hierarchy can be the spark that snowballs to regime’s ouster. This could have been the case in 1995 in the middle of the famine when a disgruntled army unit made a failed coup attempt. The regime discovered the plot and put the revolt down, after which it implemented the military-first Songun policy of prioritizing economic resources towards the military over other parts of society in order to keep the military aligned with the regime. In that case the regime was able to react and adjust to the challenge to its rule from within. But it may not always be that fortunate in the future if such challenges arise again, whether due to losing external patronage or any other reason.

Post-Collapse Scenarios

If the North Korean regime collapses suddenly, what could happen next? It depends on what one thinks are the likeliest outcomes and what their impact would be. An accurate estimate of the probabilities of each of the possible outcomes is outside the scope of this piece. But if we give each possible scenario an equal likelihood of happening, then the overall net assessment of regime collapse is negative for all of the relevant nations involved.

Scenario 1: Leadership Replaced, But Regime Carries On As Before. The regime is toppled by some internal faction. A new Supreme Leader is designated, but otherwise the overall regime carries on as before. Everything remains the same except for the brief period of uncertainty right after the previous regime collapsed when everyone was on high alert waiting for the situation to settle.
- Net Result for All Relevant Parties: Temporarily Worse, Otherwise the Same
Scenario 2: New Leadership Pursues Reform. The regime is toppled by some internal faction which pursues substantial reforms. North Korea is no longer a threat to South Korea, Japan and America, and is now a cooperative player in regional affairs. This is the only scenario explored here that leads to an overall better outcome.
- Net Result for Relevant Parties
  - For China: Better
    - Security: Better. War in China’s backyard averted. Japanese rearmament prevented.
    - Buffer Remains: Better. North Korea remains outside the control of South Korea, America or any other country or coalition with Western liberal leanings, and continues to serve as a buffer state between China and the America-led bloc.
    - Reduced American Attention In East Asia: Better
      - With the North Korean threat now gone, America has less reason to be militarily involved in the region. America also has less reason to place missile defence systems in East Asia which could render China’s military capabilities less potent.
      - South Korea and Japan have less reason to remain within the American security umbrella, and are more responsive to Chinese carrots and sticks
    - Economic Opportunities: Better. China can pursue economic projects with North Korea that were previously disallowed (and not worth it for China to evade) by UN Security Council and other measures. China can also more easily trade with South Korea since it can do so now openly by land through the North.
  - For Russia: Better
    - Economic Opportunities: Better. Russia has the green light to pursue economic projects on the Korean peninsula, including selling natural gas to South Korea through the North and link up with Korean transportation networks in order to serve as a platform that facilitates trade between East Asia and Europe.
    - America Scores a Geo-Strategic Win & Can Pay More Attention To Other Problems: Worse. The attention of America’s political establishment, diplomatic and security services, and the domestic public is freed up to focus on other issues, including Russia’s hybrid war against the America-led Western liberal order. Given Russia’s strategic calculus this wouldn’t be a welcome development. However, given that Russia’s main geostrategic location of interest is not East Asia but Europe, the overall net result of this scenario for Russia would still be net positive.
  - For USA: Better
    - Security: Better. North Korea is no longer an immediate threat to the safety of America and its allies in the region.
    - WMD Proliferation Averted: Better. North Korea regime would be less inclined to consider selling WMD capabilities to unsavory entities. Japan has less need to consider rearming itself with nuclear weapons, which prevents a nuclear arms race in East Asia.
    - American Leadership Reinforced: Better. American pressure on North Korea led to a successful reform of the regime despite China’s stated fears. Score +1 for American leadership and others’ confidence in her ability to help solve global challenges. America’s ability to influence Asian developments, indeed its strategy of Pivot to Asia, is enhanced.
  - For South Korea: Better
    - Security: Better. North Korea is no longer an immediate threat to South Korea’s safety. Even though the two countries are still wide apart on many issues, at least the potential for devastation from war is much reduced.
    - Economic Opportunities: Better. With the security related concerns taken care of, South Korea can now focus on pursuing joint economic projects involving Russia and North Korea, including sourcing Russian natural gas and potential transportation links for easier export to Europe.
    - More In Control of Own Destiny: Better. If the North Korean regime makes significant irreversible steps towards de-belligerence, then South Korea’s dependence on American security umbrella is reduced and South Korea can be more independent minded with America in cases where they differ, whether regarding security or anything else. South Korea will still want to be close to America as North Korea won’t turn into a quire boy overnight, and there’s the prospect of Chinese regional domination for which the only South Korean ally capable of providing the needed defensive heft is America. Being within a China-led bloc is a much more onerous prospect then being within an America-led bloc. But despite the fact that the South Korea-America alliance will remain strong, as things go in the geostrategic level of the human domain, having one’s position improved provides the ability to have a conversation on a more equal footing.
    - Prospect for Korean Unification Improved: Better. When 2 hostile entities resolve their mutual security issues, they are in better position to eventually reunite.
  - For Japan: Better
    - Security: Better. Like with South Korea and America, a non-belligerent North Korea is a great development for Japan’s national security, even if it’s still not a Jeffersonian democracy with the spirit of Thomas Paine. Economic and other projects become more possible to consider, but probably not on a similar scale as South Korea, since Japan doesn’t share a land border with Russia for cheaper sourcing of hydrocarbons.
Scenario 3: New Leadership Is Even More Belligerent. The regime is toppled by some internal faction and the new leadership is even more belligerent than the previous one.
- Net Result for Relevant Parties
  - For China: Worse
    - Security: Worse. A more bellicose North Korea raises the prospect for war on the Korean peninsula. Instability is not in China’s interests, especially when right across the border.
    - America More Involved In the Region: Worse. North Korea’s stunts get America’s attention and invite more American involvement in the region.
  - For Russia: Worse
    - Security: Worse. Like for China, a higher likelihood of war in East Asia is not in Russia’s interests for all the same reasons.
    - America More Involved In the Region: Worse. Ditto.
    - Economic Opportunities: Worse. Raised tensions in the region make pursuing economic projects less realistic.
  - For USA: Worse
    - Security: Worse. If North Korean threat was bad during the previous regime, the new one’s behavior is even worse. As well, the likelihood of North Korea’s WMDs winding up in the hands of other rogue states or non-state terrorist networks has increased.
    - Regional Strategy Becomes Less Strategic and More Reactive: Worse. Having to deal with a higher likelihood of war shifts attention from executing long term strategic plans to dealing with the more immediate security issues.
  - For South Korea: Worse
    - Security: Worse. Being right across the border from North Korea, South Korea has the most to lose from North Korea’s belligerence.
    - Economic Opportunities: Worse. The prospect for sourcing cheaper Russian natural gas is diminished. Being basically an island nation South Korea will continue relying on expensive LNG imports. Linking up with Russian transportation networks for cheaper trade with Europe remains unrealized.
  - For Japan: Worse
    - Security: Worse. Like with South Korea and America, a more belligerent North Korea is worse for Japan’s security.
Scenario 4: New Leadership Doesn’t Hold, Chaos Ensues. The regime is toppled by some internal faction, but the new leadership can’t hold on to power and chaos ensues. Food distribution systems break down, criminality is rampant, and there’s an overall societal collapse. Outside powers may decide to move in to restore social order and secure North Korean WMDs. That intervention may be coordinated and smooth or uncoordinated and messy, and may include any combination of China, America and South Korea. Russia and Japan would probably be involved, but mostly stay on the periphery.
- Net Result for Relevant Parties
  - For China: Worse
    - Refugee Crisis: Worse. North Koreans flee en masse across the Chinese border since entry into South Korea is impeded by the DMZ.
    - Economic & Strategic Burden: Worse. China has to deal with the economic impact of North Korean refugee crisis as well as the burden of potentially establishing marshal law in North Korea, whether in conjunction with America and South Korea or by itself.
    - America More Involved In the Region: Worse. Because South Korea is under the American security umbrella America will have to get more involved on the Korean peninsula in order to help manage the impact of North Korea’s unraveling on South Korea and the wider region. As mentioned, it’s not in China’s geostrategic interest for America to be more involved in the region.
  - For Russia: Worse
    - Economic Opportunities: Worse. The prospects of selling natural gas to South Korea through the North and connecting the Korean peninsula to Europe via Russian transport links remain unrealized.
    - Regional Influence Squeezed Out by China and America: Worse. A North Korea emergency that gets China and America heavily involved in the management of the situation would squeeze out Russian influence in the region. Although China and America would consult and coordinate with Russia and others, Russia’s ability to influence outcomes on the Korean peninsula would be diminished.
    - America More Involved In the Region: Worse. Like with China, a more proactive and involved America is not in Russia’s interest.
  - For USA: Worse
    - Security: Worse. In the middle of chaos WMDs may fall into the wrong hands or be launched, whether by accident or on purpose.
    - Economic & Strategic Burden: Worse. America would have to allocate economic and military resources in order to help maintain order on the Korean peninsula, along with South Korea and probably China.
  - For South Korea: Worse
    - Security: Worse. Being right across the border from the North, it would be bad news for South Korea if chaos ensued there.
    - Economic & Strategic Burden: Worse. Considering the economic disparity between the North and South, if the South had to step in to manage the situation in the North, even if in conjunction with America and China, it would probably be a bigger economic burden on the South on a relative basis then what West Germany faced when it merged with East Germany after the collapse of Communism in Europe. Not to mention the military burden at the outset which West Germany didn’t have to deal with.
    - Raised Prospect of Korean Unification: Better. Notwithstanding the potential burden of administering North Korean territory, such a tumultuous situation would nevertheless raise the prospects of Korean unification.
  - For Japan: Worse
    - Security: Worse. Same as for everyone else in the region, chaos in an underdeveloped country of 20+ million people with WMDs near Japan is a dangerous prospect for its security.

Option 4: Detente

This option involves making a deal with North Korea that will include providing it with security guarantees and economic aid in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable dismantling of its ability to project belligerence in the region. We argue that this is the most realistic option for addressing the North Korean threat. The details of this option are discussed in the next section.

VI. Detente: The Best Option

Our opinion is that the best way to address the North Korean threat is to pursue a comprehensive deal where through a series of reciprocal alternating steps both sides are able to make progress towards detente in a verifiable way. This will need to be complemented with a proactive strategy to reduce the regime’s options to sustain itself outside of the deal. The following discusses why we take this stance and considers the details that it may include.

Factors Working For Detente

No Mutually Exclusive Claims

The standoff on the Korean peninsula should be more solvable then other conflicts, like the Israel-Palestine conflict, where both sides claim the same land and sufficient portions of the population see the other’s presence as incompatible with one’s own. In the Korean standoff there are no claims over the same land, nor is it about religious or ethnic zealotry. And unlike the Israel-Palestine conflict, what each side wants from the other in the Korean standoff is indeed providable.

All Have the Same Top Priority

Though there are differences in how each relevant party views the Korean standoff, they all agree on the same top priority, which is to prevent a war on the Korean peninsula. As discussed above, such a prospect would be bad for all the parties involved, and their articulation of their interests recognizes this fact.

North Korea's Historical Behavior Suggests It's Willing to Cooperate

North Korea’s behavior since the end of the Cold War seems cartoonishly apocalyptic. But a deeper look into what it did, when, and why, shows that indeed it’s a rational actor and seems willing to be cooperative if the incentives are structured correctly.

Could Have Used WMDs Already. North Korea already contains WMDs. If it’s top priority was to hurt its adversaries, like ISIL zealots, it would have already done so a long time ago.
Why Advertise Capability? If North Korea wanted to develop its weapon capabilities simply for strategic military advantage, then it wouldn’t advertise them as loudly and brazenly as it does. If one wants to pull off a successful attack, he’d want his capabilities to remain unknown by his adversaries. North Korea instead invests heavily to ensure that everyone, especially America, is aware of its capabilities by flying missiles over Japan or by detonating nuclear bombs for all to see. This implies that the regime's top purpose for developing WMDs is not to attack with them, but to use them to blackmail for something that it wants. In other words, North Korea pursues WMDs not to inflict damage but for negotiation leverage.
Agreed Framework Wasn’t Given A Chance. The 1994 Agreed Framework was a flawed agreement, but it was still better then standing by, which is basically what the American policy regarding North Korea has been since then. US Congress dragged its feet in implementing the American side of the agreement. Indeed North Korea cheated on the deal and flew a missile over Japan in 1998. But at the outset it seemed to be playing ball for the first several years and stopped enrichment at the Yongbyon reactor. It’s possible that even if America had fulfilled its side of the Agreed Framework in a timely manner and proactively worked to influence North Korea’s strategic calculus, then North Korea may have still developed WMDs and threatened to attack America and its allies. We just don’t know because the Agreed Framework wasn’t given a chance, despite the fact that no other substantive policy came to replace it.

Regime is Influenceable From Outside

Since losing Soviet support, North Korea’s regime has had to depend on the wider world for sustaining itself, even if through smuggling and other nefarious activities instead of constructive rule-based relations. Chinese and Russian patronage is only a barebones lifeline. Its Juche policy of self reliance is that in name only. The country is too small and economically backwards to be able to rely on itself for economic sustenance anything close to on par with its neighbors. Such dependence on the outside world should make the North Korea willing to negotiate. In fact, over the years the regime has been basically saying exactly that.

Factors Working Against Detente

Regime's History of Breaking Rules

North Korea will try to have it both ways if it can get away with it. It’s not an actor on the international stage that puts much value on reputation building. Despite the fact that China and Russia are North Korea’s allies, some Chinese and Russian companies who have done business in North Korea have reportedly had difficulty getting North Korean counterparts to stick to existing deals. If the regime is willing to screw over its friends, it’ll surely try to do it to its adversaries. Any deal with North Korea that doesn’t include the stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms is useless. Reducing the regime’s options to sustain itself outside the parameters of the deal will require dedicated attention, resources, and strategic competence.

Regime's Patrons Derive Strategic Benefits From Tensions

North Korea’s main patrons, China and Russia, want peace like everyone else as their top priority. But the Korean standoff isn’t all bad for them as they have articulated their strategic goals. As long as the tensions don’t slip into an all-out war, then they act as a useful distraction that sucks up large parts of America’s diplomatic and strategic resources away from countering Russia’s attempts to undermine liberal international norms and China’s goal of undermining America’s leadership specifically. As well, the Korean standoff has the potential to drive a wedge between (or bring closer together) America and its allies South Korea and Japan, depending on how America handles the situation. Because of these benefits that China and Russia derive from the North Korea problem, their support for comprehensive detente may be tepid.

Regime Has Other Friends Too

Besides China and Russia, North Korea has in the past cooperated with others who wouldn’t be part to any deal, and so technically speaking wouldn’t be on the hook to pressure North Korea to follow it, unless measures are taken to prevent their aiding the regime. They tend to be rogue states like Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Cuba and others. Pakistan’s AQ Khan network, which included multiple countries, had known ties to the North Korean nuclear program. Iran had traded in missile systems with North Korea. Syria’s nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in 2007 was built with help from North Korea. There have been intercepts of missile technology shipped between North Korea and Cuba. These countries may be able to help North Korea evade the deal’s restrictions unless there’s a vigorous effort to prevent that.

What Could a Deal Look Like?

A More Comprehensive & Multilateral Version of 1994 Agreed Framework

The 1994 Agreed Framework was much more modest that what would make sense to pursue in 2018, but it was a good start and was proceeding apace despite the fact that both North Korea and America had very little trust in each other. The deal unravelled because neither side fully implement its end of the bargain. If it was pursued with vigor, it’s possible that the Agreed Framework could have succeeded and led to a more comprehensive subsequent deals. Or perhaps North Korea would have cheated anyway. It’s impossible to tell for sure what could have happened then. But what is possible is to give it another go and do it right this time.

Goal: Detente. The goal should be a comprehensive deal between North Korea on one side and America and its allies South Korea and Japan on the other side, with China and Russia as facilitating parties, whereby the North Korean threat is comprehensively and verifiably eliminated in exchange for security guarantees, diplomatic recognition, and economic aid.
Sequence of Reciprocal Steps. Instead of an all-at-once deal where both sides have to do everything immediately after the deal is signed, a more realistic deal would involve a sequence of steps taken by both sides in an alternating fashion. The advantages of such an approach are:
- Makes Agreeing on Distant Goals Easier. It’s easier for adversaries to agree on a distant common goal that requires a lot of steps to get to when each side has agreed upon who will do what and in what sequence.
- Requires Less Trust To Effectively Proceed. If a deal requires making a number of complex and irreversible steps, then from the perspective of each side it’s risky to proceed without a high level of trust between them. If one side implements its end of the bargain, while the other side drags its feet, then it’ll be at a disadvantage. However, if the deal includes a sequence of alternating steps, then each side can gauge whether the other side is fulfilling its responsibilities before proceeding further with its own steps. Because such an agreement allows each side to gauge whether the other side is keeping with its obligations, it requires less trust between them to effectively proceed.
- Information Discovery. A sequence of reciprocal steps is also useful tool for gauging the regime’s willingness to play ball. If it stops being cooperative at some point in the agreed sequence, then even if the deal goes nowhere afterwards it would still have been a good test, for current and future purposes, of the regime’s willingness to forgo belligerence in return for economic and security benefits.
Verifiable. The regime has a history of cheating on deals, not paying its debts, and has at times even screwed their own patrons. Any measure that doesn’t involve thorough verifications has 0 value.
Multilateral. For detente to succeed without giving North Korea easy ways to cheat, all the relevant parties should be on the hook to support the deal. There has already been a lot of diplomatic activity including both Koreas, America, China, Japan and Russia during the Six-Party Talks in the 2000’s. Their participation in any new deal attempts will be critical.
Comprehensive. Although it’s the nuclear bombs that get most of the media attention, they’re not the only WMDs that North Korea possesses. If a deal addresses nuclear weapons, but not the regime’s chemical, biological, cyber and missile technologies, then North Korea could still be in the position to blackmail America and its allies, just with different capabilities. Nuclear weapons may be the first ones that the deal addresses, but the deal’s end-goal should be not just taking away a weapon capability but to address the regime’s overall regional belligerence. Detente is not just an exchange of things, but is a more comprehensive change in attitude from both sides. Among the aspects of such detente would be:
- Nuclear weapons
- Chemical weapons
- Biological weapons
- Cyber weapons
- Conventional artillery pointed at South Korea
- Missile delivery technologies
- Weapons trade with other nations and non-state actors

Carrots & Sticks

Affecting the regime’s calculus requires structuring incentives so that the regime’s ability to sustain itself is tied to the viability of the deal. If the regime follows the letter and spirit of the deal, then it should be provided economic and other benefits. At the same time the regime’s options outside of the deal should be vigorously curtailed.

Economic Aid That Influences Regime’s Calculus. North Korea’s economic base needs basic inputs. The 1994 Agreed Framework included shipments of heavy fuel oil and a light water reactor for electricity production to replace the more weaponizable Yongbyon reactor. North Korea’s current imports are mostly consumer and industrial inputs, and basic products. As per a new deal, economic aid can include these things. But not all economic aid is created equal when it comes to influencing North Korea’s calculus to stick to the deal. Some types of economic aid is more effective than others in this regard. A comprehensive study of such economic aid is outside the scope of this piece. But we can still consider some aspects of such aid:
- Provider has unique ability to deliver
- Can be dialed up or down on demand
- Can be turned off with more pain going to regime instead of regular people
- Has little opportunity to contribute to weapons development
- Expires and has to be replenished regularly
- Examples
  - Food, fuel and basic consumer products are consumed and have to be regularly replaced.
  - Luxury items consumed by the elite can be cutoff without impacting the lives of the average people (though providing the regime with expensive wine may look bad in the media to the average person).
  - Electric power that is provided to North Korea via extended transmission lines from outside the country could be cutoff at an instant, and their replacement from another country would require large investments and take a long time to build.
Squeeze Regime’s Options Outside of the Deal
- Cut Off Regime’s Smuggling Networks. Any detente with North Korea should be irrespective of putting pressure on its smuggling networks. In fact, removing the regime’s ability to smuggle goods and weapons will only incentivize the regime to stick with the deal for lack of other options.
- Get Others On Board. Beyond the 6 main countries with a stake in the resolution to the Korean standoff, ideally as many others as possible should be party to a unified coordinating mechanism in order to squeeze the regime’s smuggling opportunities. Something like the Proliferation Security Initiative, among the few effective initiative from George W. Bush administration regarding North Korea, is a good start for such a policy.
Reduce Regime’s Ability to Blackmail in the Future. See section “Reducing the Threat” for details on this.

What Should NOT Be Included in the Deal?

North Korea’s Internal Humanitarian Crisis. Although North Korea’s internal systemic failings and an Orwellian socio-political system are at the root of its belligerent behavior abroad, putting pressure on the regime regarding its internal affairs risks dis-incentivizing it from pursuing detente. The goal of influencing the regime’s external behavior is hard enough. Adding to that the additional goal of forcing the regime to change how it manages its domestic system may jeopardize the whole effort. In this case perfection may be the enemy of the good. It is very unfortunate that in order to reduce the risk of a war of annihilation on the Korean peninsula, the plight of North Korea’s 20m+ people wouldn’t be meaningfully addressed, at least not at first. But such is the state of affairs within the Homo Sapiens species. The human race has made a lot of progress, but pockets of despair still remain. That said, if detente with the regime doesn’t work, then all the available tools should be employed to pressure the regime externally and internally, including cracking the regime’s informational firewall so that its people get to see what the rest of the world is like and raise their expectations of the regime. But unless the regime cheats on the deal, then informational influence measures should be prepared but otherwise holstered. See section “Reducing the Threat” for more on this.
Relevant Parties’ Strategic Interests Outside the Korean Standoff. In order to increase the chances of the deal’s success, the strategic interests of the relevant parties outside the context of the Korean standoff should be excluded from the negotiations. If support for detente by any relevant party is contingent on context beyond the Korean standoff, then if those contexts change then the relevant party may have fewer reasons to support detente. Considering that everyone’s participation is important for detente to succeed, such mixing of unrelated issues may be counterproductive, even if convenient at the time of negotiations.
Unnecessary Dependence On Russia. Although both China and Russia are North Korea’s patrons, it’s really China that calls the shots. China and Russia have a seeming understanding that Russia will defer to China on East Asian issues, whereas China defers to Russia on Eastern European issues. As well, China has much more to lose from war on the Korean peninsula because China’s population is much closer to it than Russia’s, most of whose population is in Eastern Europe thousands of miles away. Since Russia has less stake in the Korean standoff, and has a history of duplicitousness under Putin, it should be relied on as least as possible. So for example, Russia should not be allowed to perform any sole verifications of North Korea’s denuclearization or take ownership of North Korea’s WMDs for safekeeping. Putin convinced the Obama administration to do such things regarding Syria’s chemical weapons, and that turned out to be a farce that not only made Obama seem foolish, but was devastating to the Syrian people. After Putin supposedly helped Obama save face after Assad ignored Obama's "red line" ultimatum by stepping in and supposedly removing chemical weapons from Syria, the Assad regime subsequently gassed his own people and Obama lamented but otherwise held no one to account. Such amateurism shouldn’t be repeated in the context of the Korean standoff. In any case, Russia has a lot of economic and strategic interests in seeing a resolution to the standoff, such that giving this non-core player leverage with regard to how detente proceeds would be not only imprudent, but also unnecessary.

What Will Success Depend On?

Comprehensiveness

The deal with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) fell through because, besides Trump wanting to make Obama look bad, it was also too narrow in that it only addressed Iran’s nuclear program and not its overall belligerent regional behavior, and included key provisions that would expire in 10 years. The same “imperfections” shouldn’t wind up in the deal with North Korea if the goal is to address the root problem and facilitate a real detente.

Verifiability & Enforceability

If history is any guide, North Korea will try to cheat on the deal if it can get away with it. Therefore the deal should allow any milestone of the deal, like dismantlement of capabilities and the like, to be fully verified. If the regime cheats, all the relevant parties should be on the hook to take enforcement action to put it back on the right path. The deal should have mechanisms by which benefits to North Korea can be rolled back if it doesn’t abide to its side of the bargain.

Commitment From All Parties

All the relevant parties should be interested in the deal’s success. As of now that is the case (see section “Relevant Parties & Their Positions”), and the deal should be structured in a way that keeps those interests aligned going forward. Otherwise if, for example, the Chinese decide that it’s in their interest to ignore the deal for whatever reason, then the deal runs the risk of unravelling.

VII. Reducing the Threat

Regardless of whether detente can be reached with North Korea or not, measures can be taken to reduce the North Korean threat, or at least influence the regime’s calculus to get back to the negotiating table.

Pressure Regime’s External Sources of Support

The regime’s opportunities to source external economic and military support should be limited to those proscribed by the deal so that such channels can be monitored and to incentivize the regime to stick to the deal. China may be supportive of this because such an arrangement would stave off regime collapse that China is much afraid of and gets America off of China’s back regarding the latter’s economic lifelines to the regime, albeit from controllable and monitorable sources. From the perspective of America and its allies, this would be beneficial because it would put the control over the regime’s economic lifelines not just in the hands of China, but also in the hands of America and its allies. The pursuit of such measures with China would also be helpful in that, even if China doesn’t cooperate, it would help gauge how much of China’s economic lifelines to the regime are meant to stave off chaos as opposed to giving China strategic leverage over the situation for purposes other than preventing regime collapse.

Exclude From International Financial Platforms

Whatever measures can be taken to exclude North Korea from international financial platform beyond existing UN Security Council and other measures should be pursued.

Squeeze Smuggling Networks

The regime’s economic and military smuggling networks tend to operate in places where North Korea has a diplomatic or diaspora presence. Some of these countries have full relations with North Korea because it’s in their strategic interests, while some others tolerate North Korea’s activities within their territory because they either can’t or won’t do much about it. Those that support North Korea should be pressured to reconsider, while those that tolerate North Korea’s activities because their small size makes them want to be friends with everyone should be given strategic support. Among such countries are:

China, Russia, Mongolia, and Gulf Cooperation Council members, which are the largest users of North Korea’s exported labor
Japan’s Chongryon Korean diaspora
Malaysia
Philippines
Pakistan
Iran
Syria
Cuba
Venezuela
Indonesia
Singapore

Prepare Measures to Pressure the Regime From Within

If the regime refuses to cooperate or reneges on the deal, then measures could be taken to sharpen the regime’s mind by reducing its ability to control domestic narratives about itself and the wider world. This would be done in conjunction with South Korea, which has experience in giving the North Korean citizens alternative narratives. The regime’s main goal is self preservation by sustaining its current domestic power structure through any means necessary, both internal and external. If the regime sees that its ability to control its people’s mind and body can be challenged from the outside, then it’ll be more inclined to pursue negotiation instead of belligerence.

Establish Ties With Regime's Power Centers

A socio-political system that relies on coercion to keep its hierarchy of influence stable also creates the forces that may undermine it at the same time. When anyone who is part of this hierarchy fears for their position they start to weigh the benefits of hedging in case the regime, rightly or wrongly, decides to go after them. The higher up the hierarchy one is, the more such considerations come into play. Being in a more prominent role makes one more visible on the regime’s radar such that wrong moves have a higher price. Getting to a high levels of power probably required one to have sharp elbows in the first place, especially in a place like North Korea, thereby creating enemies while on the way to the top. The need to hedge in case one’s position becomes untenable creates opportunities for outsiders to establish lines of influence that can put pressure on the regime from within.

Raise Expectations of North Korean Citizens

There are few things that an Orwellian repressive state fears more than a restive domestic populace who are aware of how their situation compares to the outside world. If the control over what their citizens know and see wasn't a serious factor in the regime's calculations, then the regime wouldn't spend so much time and resources on shaping the narrative for its citizens. When you're reeling from economic sanctions and want to make sure that the military and the top power brokers are kept happy with economic perks, you're not going to spend a ton on building gigantic bronze statues of yourself riding a horse like a mythical Pegasus just because. In fact, the lengths to which a regime goes to invest in propaganda is directly proportional to how much it deems such efforts as necessary. Considering how isolated and unaware the North Korean citizens are kept, letting even a little light in would go a long way in this regard. A lot of sunshine will go even further. There’s a reason why Putin is willing for Russia to suffer economic sanctions and deteriorated relationship with America and much of Europe by employing informational influence spy operations against their domestic socio-political systems: because it works, especially given the Internet and automation technology acting like a force multiplier. North Korea is not an internet saturated country, but no country is immune to a comprehensive and multidisciplinary influence efforts, especially when the information being propagated has the advantage of being true:

Radio/TV Transmission
Internet activities aimed at top crust of the elite who are the only ones with internet access in North Korea
Balloon or drone drops of foreign consumer goods
Dissemination of portable media (USB flash drives, portable DVD players, etc) that show how people live outside North Korea, especially in South Korea where people share the same ethnicity, language and culture as North Koreans

Reduce Regime’s Ability to Blackmail in the Future

Regardless of whether the regime is willing to pursue detente or not, it’s ability to threaten others with WMDs should be curtailed as much as possible.

Missile Defenses

America has partially deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in South Korea in response to threatening stunts from the North. Additional deployments, including Japan and other areas in East Asia, would further reduce the threat of North Korean missiles. The deployments of such defenses are sometimes politically tricky given the antagonism against overt military-related installations by the pacifist portion of South Korea and Japanese citizenry that’s sizable enough to have domestic political ramifications. As well, China and Russia that see the expansion of military capabilities of the America-led block as against their own strategic interests because it would render their own offensive military capabilities as less powerful. However, at the same time such calculus by China and Russia should make them more willing to put pressure on North Korea to cool it, which would help the situation.

Ability to Neutralize Regime's Conventional Artillery Quickly

Even if it’s possible to swiftly incapacitate North Korea’s WMD capabilities in case hostilities break out, there’s still the prospect that North Korea can devastate Seoul, South Korea’s largest metropolitan area of 20+ million people, in minutes with conventional artillery due to proximity. Having the ability to neutralize these artillery pieces quickly before they’re able to devastate South Korea, whether via drones or more experimental technologies like directed energy or anything else, would greatly diminish North Korea’s ability to threaten South Korea, and would further incentivize the North Korean regime to pursue a peaceful resolution to the Korean standoff.

Facilitate Historical Reconciliation Between South Korea and Japan

If South Korea and Japan cooperate more closely, not just in terms of trade but also in terms of regional security, then North Korea would face a more unified front. The chief impediment to such closer ties is the unresolved differences over Japan’s victimization of Korea during the 1st half of the 20th century. Japan feels that South Korean continuing grievance is unwarranted because it has already apologized for its past behavior, paid restitution to South Korean victims, has entered into formal agreements with South Korea regarding the issue, and has behaved as a responsible nation since WW2. On the other hand, the South Korean citizenry tends to have high levels of mistrust towards Japan because Japanese Prime Ministers have made high profile visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which commemorates the Japanese war dead that include some who have been labeled as war criminals by the international community, has downplayed its colonial past in its own school textbooks, and hasn’t been sufficiently contrite regarding its brutal treatment of Koreans many of whom died, were forcibly recruited into the Japanese army, or were forced into prostitution to service the sexual needs of the Japanese soldiers. We believe that the main reasons for this continued disagreement don’t pertain to the level of monetary reparations, or insufficiency of official agreements, or even overt fears of renewed Japanese aggression. Instead the two haven’t been able to get past the historical issues because the Japanese leaders never made an emotional and dramatic enough gesture of contrition that the regular South Korean people would take to heart like the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt did in 1970 by dramatically kneeling at the monument to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Encouraging the Japanese top politicians to make a dramastic over-the-top gesture of contrition that’s meant to be consumed not just by the South Korean political establishment, but by the regular people, would go a long way toward removing the domestic political pressure in South Korea against closer security ties with Japan. In turn, a closer relationship between South Korea and Japan would present a more unified front against North Korean aggression and would reduce the opportunity for North Korea to play South Korea and Japan against each other. China, which is a relevant party to the Korean standoff, should also get such an apology as well. It’s been mentioned that Japan also suffered greatly during WW2, and therefore it can’t just dole out apologies but receive no recognition for its own sufferings. Indeed, Japan suffered mass casualties, including twice being attacked by an atomic bomb. However, during the same war Germany was basically obliterated, but it still had the capacity to be unconditionally contrite after the war such that it successfully got past its aggressor image in the eyes of its victim nations. If Germany could do it, so can Japan. Assigning quantifiable weights to how much each nation suffered during a particular war will always be a subjective and imperfect endeavour. There are more pressing concerns then historical grievances, like the WMD threat from North Korea, that are not just a matter of past history but are a pressing concern right here and now. America would be well served to encourage Japan to make another apology for its past behavior in the region, this time with more dramatic displays of contrition meant for consumption not by politicians but as though by a rape victim. In turn, America should encourage South Korean leaders to set the stage domestically to accept it and take it to heart, instead of feeding on latent anti-Japanese feelings to score cheap political points domestically.

Establish Common Ground With China Regarding North Korea

Both America and China share common priorities with regard to the Korean standoff. Working with China in a more partner capacity would go a long way to isolate North Korea and increase the chance of a peaceful resolution. For China the fears include a mass influx of refugees, potential fallout that may flow into Chinese territories from North Korean WMDs, and the uncertainty of whether the new North Korean leadership would be friendly to China. For America, South Korea and Japan the considerations include limiting damage to themselves, managing the humanitarian crisis that would ensue, and establishing social order as quickly as possible. The concerns of both camps overlap to a large degree, and establishing a mutual understanding between them should in theory be feasible and prudent. Such prior coordination regarding North Korea would be useful not only in case the worst happens, but would also facilitate common efforts towards detente or any other measure meant to address the North Korean problem.

Help the Regime See a Less Belligerent Path To Survival

The most seamless way to influence someone to be less belligerent is to provide alternate paths to the same goals that don’t involve belligerence. The North Korean regime doesn’t want to act belligerently just for its own sake. It pulls stunts in order to get the attention of those who are in position to provide it security and economic benefits, namely America. Such benefits would help the regime sustain itself in light of its own domestic internal failings. Is there a way by which the regime can improve its economic and military standing without resorting to threatening others? Yes. China and Vietnam have done it (though China’s size is so huge that its unbridled growth, combined with anti-liberal MO, create other challenges). The North Korean regime has multiple times alluded to the fact that it’s considering such steps. But considering how Orwellian their domestic system currently is, making changes to how the regime manages order domestically and changing its base of legitimacy from cultish ideology towards economic growth may be risky for the regime. Rigid social systems that rely on coercion have the disadvantage of being inflexible and subject to collapse without a careful transition process and astute leadership. Engaging with the regime to help it achieve such reform would go a long way to reducing the North Korean threat, even if it won’t turn North Korea into a model liberal nation overnight.

Albert Einstein dealt with the mechanics of physics. Adam Smith dealt with the mechanics of humans. Here we fuse both types of thinking to better understand the world and ourselves.

Aug 23 How to Address the North Korean Threat?

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

Problem Defined

Thesis

Best Policy: Detente with Carrots & Sticks

Disproven Policies: George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” & Barack Obama’s “Strategic Patience”

Know All the Cooks in the Kitchen

About This Piece

II. Historical Background

Historical Fast-Forward

Dynasties & Feudalism

Japanese Imperialism & WW2

Artificial Division: Stalin's Mini-Me Orwellian Regime in the North & America-Sponsored Clunky Authoritarianism in the South

Korean War & Cold War

Cold War Ends, WMD Threats Begin

Previous Attempts at Solving the Problem

Agreed Framework (1994)

South Korea's Sunshine Policy (1998-2008)

Six-Party Talks (2003-2009)

Singapore Summit (2018)

Policies of US Presidential Administrations Since Cold War Ended

Bill Clinton: 1994 Agreed Framework

George W. Bush: "Axis of Evil" & Six-Party Talks

Barack Obama: "Strategic Patience"

Donald Trump: TBD?

III. North Korean Regime

Evolution of North Korea’s Regime

Orwellian Perfect Storm

North & South Proceed on Different Paths

Cold War Ends, But Kim Regime Endures

What Sustains the Regime?

Domestic Social Controls

Economic Racket

Weapon Sales

Strategic Patrons: China & Russia

South Korea's Sunshine Policy

Regime’s Strategy Going Forward

Main Goal: Survival

Methods

Observations

North & South Started Similarly, But Diverged Greatly

Regime is Rational & Influenceable

Domestic Source of Power is Shifting

Sanctions & Isolation Measures Are Having An Effect

Regime's Ability to Control Narrative Declining, But Still High

Implications

North Korea is More Influenceable From Outside Since End of Cold War

Nevertheless It's Unrealistic to Expect Regime to Wither Away By Itself

Questions the Regime Is Grappling With

Follow the China Model?

How to Reform Without Tripping?

How to Get the Most From America?

What Regime Is Pursuing

Detente With USA

Adapt But Preserve

IV. Relevant Parties & Their Positions

South Korea

Goals

Perspective on Others

China

Goals

Perspective on Others

Russia

Goals

Perspective on Others

Japan

Goals

Perspective on Others

USA

Goals

Perspective on Others

V. What Are the Options?

Option 1: Military Attack on North Korea’s WMD Capabilities

High Risk of Large Casualties on Both Sides

Would Likely Involve Some or All Cooks in the Kitchen

Option 2: Stand By

Option 3: Get China to Cut Economic Lifelines to North Korea

How Could Economic Privation Lead to Regime Collapse?